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 1 
REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA 
AND THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CLASSIFICATORY FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Genevieve Lakier* 
 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech 
is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades now, the Supreme 
Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas 
or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained 
only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny.1 In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that 
regulate speech for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser, and 
often quite deferential, standard.2 Whether a law is found to be content-based or content-
neutral therefore determines, in many cases, whether a First Amendment challenge to it 
succeeds. 
  Despite the importance of the distinction, the Court has had trouble settling on a 
single test of content-based lawmaking. Instead, it has vacillated between two different 
tests. In one line of cases, the Court has insisted that laws are content-based whenever 
they treat speakers differently because of the content of their speech—that is to say, 
whenever they employ explicit content distinctions. In another line of cases, the Court 
has instead insisted that laws are content-based only when they cannot be justified by a 
content-neutral purpose—that is to say, when the government cannot adequately 
demonstrate that the distinction the laws draws furthers some purpose other than to 
restrict speech because the government dislikes its content, or fears its communicative 
effects.  
  These two tests of content-based lawmaking are not merely different; in many 
cases, they lead to different results. Hence lower courts tasked with determining whether 
a given law is content-neutral or content-based have had to choose between two 
competing but incompatible lines of precedent. The result has been the creation of what 
commentators have described as a confused,3 inconsistent, 4 and highly malleable body of 
law.5  
                                                            
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. This paper benefited 
enormously from the comments of Amy J. Cohen, Aziz Huq, Richard McAdams, Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis 
Michael Seidman, David Strauss, Nelson Tebbe, and Laura Weinrib. I am also grateful for the feedback I 
received from participants in the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop and the University of Chicago 
Law School Works in Progress Workshop. Excellent research assistance was provided by Lisa Frasco, 
Kathrine Gutierrez, Kevin Oliver, Jacob Walley, and Katie Ryan. 
 1 See, for example, United States v Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc, 529 US 803, 817 (2000); 
R.A.V. v City of St Paul, Minn, 505 US 377, 382 (1992). 
 2 The standard articulation of this test can be found in Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 
791 (1989) (requiring content-neutral speech regulations to be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and [to] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information”).   
3 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 McGeorge L Rev 595, 602 (2003) (“[T]he Court has experienced increasing difficulty 
in making [content determinations], and in making them consistently.”).  
4 Barry McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting Freedom 
of Expression, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1347, 1353 (2006). 
 5 Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable 
Doctrine, 13 Comm L & Pol 131, 132–34 (2008).  
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  Two terms ago, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,6 the Court attempted to bring some 
clarity to this messy area of First Amendment jurisprudence when it held that laws that 
employ content distinctions are always content-based, regardless of the purposes they 
serve.7 The Court acknowledged that in earlier cases it had looked at the government’s 
purposes when deciding whether a given law was or was not content-based. It insisted, 
however, that those cases dealt only with regulations that did not treat speakers 
differently because of what they said—that did not make what it described as  “obvious” 
or “subtle” content distinctions.8 The Court thus construed the test of content neutrality as 
a two-step inquiry in which courts first determine whether a law makes facial content 
distinctions, and second, if—but only if—it doesn’t, do they look at the purposes that 
justify the law.9 
  By insisting that both the face of the law and the government’s purposes have a 
role to play in the content-neutrality inquiry, the Reed Court managed to reconcile what 
up until then had appeared to be irreconcilable precedents. What this required, however, 
was the implicit overruling of the multiple decisions in which the Court did what the 
Reed majority said it had never done: namely, it held that a law that made facial content-
distinctions was content neutral because it could be justified by reference to a content-
neutral purpose.10 And what it means, going forward, is that the government will have a 
much harder time defending facially content-based laws against constitutional challenges 
than it did in the past, when, notwithstanding the conflicting instructions they received 
from the Supreme Court, lower courts frequently held that laws that made facial content 
distinctions were content-neutral. 
  Reed thus represents an important change in First Amendment doctrine, and one 
that will in all likelihood have a significant impact in many areas of law. Indeed, we are 
already seeing evidence of Reed’s effects across the country, as courts apply strict 
scrutiny—and strike down—laws that previously were, or likely would have been, upheld 
as content neutral prior to Reed.11 This may only be the tip of the iceberg. By insisting 
that strict scrutiny applies to all laws that treat speakers differently because of the content 
of their speech, Reed potentially imperils the hundreds, even perhaps thousands, of local, 
state, and federal laws that make subject matter or viewpoint distinctions. 12 The decision 
                                                            
6 135 S Ct 2218 (2015). 
7 Id at 2227. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 See note 88, and accompanying text. 
11 See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v Attorney Gen. United States, 825 F3d 149 (3rd Cir 2016); Sarver 
v. Chartier, 813 F3d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir 2016); Cent Radio Co v City of Norfolk, 811 F3d 625, 631 (4th 
Cir 2016); Norton v City of Springfield, Ill, 806 F3d 411 (7th Cir 2015). 
 12 Laws that make facial content distinctions include local, state, and federal sign laws; laws that 
zone adult movie theatres and bookstores differently than other kinds of theatres and bookstores; laws that 
impose special tax burdens on lobbying and other expressive activities; campaign finance laws that 
distinguish between electioneering and non-electioneering communications; mail regulations that allow 
certain kinds of publications lower rates on their mail; and even portions of the Digital Copyright 
Millennium Act that prohibit the posting of certain kinds of information. See Universal City Studios, Inc v 
Corley, 273 F3d 429, 447–55 (2d Cir 2001). This is by no means a complete list. For more discussion of 
some of the laws that Reed may affect, see Part II.B. 
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thus demonstrates once again the pronounced deregulatory tilt of the Roberts Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence.13  
 This Article examines the change that Reed makes to First Amendment doctrine, 
and its normative justifications. It does so by means of an analogy to the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence, and specifically its case law dealing with race discrimination. 
  As the Article demonstrates, the shift that Reed enacts in First Amendment law 
resembles in many respects the shift that occurred several decades ago in equal protection 
law, when the Court squarely embraced what scholars have described as an anti-
classificatory test of race discrimination and insisted that all laws that employ racial 
distinctions are presumptively invalid, no matter the purposes the government invokes to 
justify them.14 Reed insists, similarly, that all laws that employ content distinctions are 
presumptively invalid, no matter the purposes the government invokes to justify them. It 
announces what we might thus describe as an anti-classificatory test of content 
discrimination. In so doing, it makes it—in theory at least—as difficult for the 
government to defend facially content-based laws against constitutional challenge as it is 
to defend racially classificatory laws. 
  The question that Reed raises is whether it should be as difficult to defend facially 
content-based laws against constitutional challenge as it is to defend racially 
classificatory ones. Some scholars have argued that the answer to this question is an 
obvious and unqualified yes.15 This Article suggests that the answer is a good deal more 
complicated than that. This is because of the value that content distinctions possess, as 
regulatory tools.  
   In its equal protection cases, the Court has insisted that all laws that employ racial 
distinctions should be treated as presumptively invalid because these distinctions are not, 
in the vast majority of circumstances, relevant to the government’s legitimate regulatory 
concerns. It is this fact, the Court has insisted, that allows courts to presume that when 
the government employs racial distinctions as regulatory tools, either prejudice or animus 
motivates its actions.  
   Content distinctions are not, however, usually irrelevant to the government’s 
legitimate regulatory concerns. Instead, they play an important role in the regulation of 
both the public and private spheres. What this means is that the mere fact that a law 
employs content distinctions is not enough to create a presumption of bad intent. The 
consequence is that the Reed Court’s embrace of an anti-classificatory test of content-
based lawmaking is likely to result in the invalidation of a good many laws that are not in 
fact the product of a discriminatory purpose and that do not otherwise pose a significant 
                                                            
13 For other perspectives on the Roberts Court’s approach to the First Amendment, see Genevieve 
Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 Harv L Rev 2166 (2016); Gregory P. Magarian, Marrow 
of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 Wm & Mary L 
Rev 1339 (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 Fed Comm L J 579 
(2011). 
14 Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U Miami L Rev 9, 10 (2003) (“Roughly speaking, [the anti-classification] principle 
holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a 
forbidden category: for example, their race”). For more discussion, see notes 114-121 and accompanying 
text. 
15 See, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for 
Content Neutrality, 16 U Pa J Const L 1261, 1305 (2014); Chemerinsky, 63 Fed Comm L J at 59–61 (cited 
in note 13).   
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threat to First Amendment interests. The costs of the Reed rule are likely, in other words, 
to be significant.  
  The fact that the test of content-based lawmaking announced in Reed is likely to 
result in the invalidation of a good number of laws that pose no apparent threat to any 
significant First Amendment interest suggest that it can be justified only if there is no 
other, less costly, means of protecting speakers against discrimination. It is by no means 
obvious, however, that there isn’t. Indeed, in her concurring opinion in Reed, Justice 
Kagan suggested an alternative test of content-based lawmaking that may be superior to 
Reed in a variety of ways. 
  By exploring the connections between equal protection and free speech law, this 
Article attempts to shed new light on familiar First Amendment questions. It proceeds in 
four parts. Part I examines the decades-long struggle on the Court between two 
competing approaches to the identification of content-based laws, and the significant shift 
Reed enacts in the doctrine. Part II explores Reed’s virtues as a test of content-based 
lawmaking. Part III explores its significant drawbacks by means of an analogy to the 
Equal Protection Clause. Part IV explores the alternative tests the Court could employ to 
identify content-based regulations of speech and suggests why these would be superior to 
the very broad anti-classificatory test that Reed announces.   
 
I.  IDENTIFYING CONTENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
The First Amendment guarantees expressive freedom—specifically, “the freedom 
of speech, and press.”16 For over seventy years, however, the Court has held that the First 
Amendment prohibits not only state actions that make it very difficult for individuals to 
express themselves but also regulations—even not very repressive ones—that “unfairly 
discriminate” among speakers based on the content of their speech.17 It has interpreted 
the First Amendment, in other words, to guarantee not only expressive liberty but also 
expressive equality, of a sort.  
The Court has read an anti-discrimination principle into the First Amendment 
because it has recognized that what freedom of speech requires is not only that 
individuals can speak but that they can do so in a public arena that is free from 
governmental manipulation and control. 18  It has accordingly interpreted the First 
Amendment to guarantee not only an individual right to speak but also the existence of a 
particular kind of social institution—what is commonly referred to today as the 
“marketplace of ideas.”19   
                                                            
16 US Const Amend I. 
17 The quote comes from Cox v New Hampshire, which is the first case I know of that explicitly 
recognizes the First Amendment antidiscrimination principle. 312 US 569, 576 (1941) (recognizing that 
municipalities have the “authority to control the use of [their] public streets for parades or processions” and 
to impose “time, place and manner” restrictions on those who wish to participate in parades, so long as they 
do so “without unfair discrimination”).  
18 See, for example, Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 24–25 (1971) (arguing that the “constitutional 
right of free expression . . . is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of 
public discussion”); Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press 
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”). 
19 See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1 
(1984). 
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Laws that discriminate among speakers based on the content of their speech, the 
Court has argued, threaten the vitality and independence of this marketplace of ideas. 
They do so by giving a competitive advantage to ideas and messages the government 
likes.20 They also, the Court has argued, undermine the “equality of status” of those who 
participate in public debate.21 For these reasons, the Court has insisted that “regulations 
that permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of its message 
cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.”22 
Ensuring that regulations that permit the government to engage in content 
discrimination aren’t tolerated has proven to be no easy matter, however. This is in part a 
consequence of what the Court has interpreted the prohibition against discrimination to 
mean. 
Even though the primary argument that the Court has relied upon to explain why 
discriminatory laws violate the First Amendment is a consequentialist one—namely, that 
laws of this sort pose a threat to the “robust [and] wide-open” debate the First 
Amendment is intended to guarantee23—the Court has unequivocally rejected the idea 
that laws might be considered discriminatory merely on the basis of their effects on the 
speech marketplace.24  Instead, the Court has tended to equate discrimination with 
discriminatory purpose. The Court has not done so explicitly.25 Nevertheless, it has, 
almost without exception, insisted that the evil the prohibition against content 
discrimination guards against are efforts by the government to “proscrib[e] speech, or . . .  
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed,” or to otherwise 
advance what Justice Scalia once described as “thought-control purposes.”26 
The Court has nevertheless expressed considerable skepticism about the ability of 
courts to accurately identify, in individual cases, when the government acts with bad 
                                                            
 20 R.A.V., 505 US at 387 (content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”); City of Ladue v Gilleo, 512 US 43, 60 
(1994) (O’Connor concurring) (noting that “the free speech principle” makes it “improper [for the 
government to] attempt[] to value some forms of speech over others, or . . . to distort public debate”). 
 21 Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 96 (1972). 
 22 Regan v Time, Inc, 468 US 641, 648–49 (1984). 
23 NY Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964). 
24 Ward, 491 US at 791 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression 
is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”). 
25 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U Chi L Rev 413, 428 (1996) (noting that the Court “has hesitated to discuss the 
[role that] illicit motive [plays in First Amendment law] in any detail or with any directness”).  
26 R.A.V., 505 US at 382; Madsen v Women’s Health Center, Inc, 512 US 753, 794–95 (1994). See 
also Gilleo, 512 US at 51 (arguing that regulations that treat some speakers differently from others threaten 
First Amendment interests because of the risk that they “may represent a governmental attempt to give one 
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people . . . [or] to control . . . 
the search for political truth”) (quotation marks omitted); id at 60 (O’Connor concurring) (noting that “the 
free speech principle” makes it “improper [for the government to] attempt[] to value some forms of speech 
over others, or . . . to distort public debate”); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc v Ragland, 481 US 221, 228–
29 (1987) (arguing that discriminatory taxes are prohibited by the First Amendment because they give the 
government “a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected”). See also Kagan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 414 
(cited in note 25) (arguing that “First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past 
several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental 
motives”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U Pa L Rev 615, 617 
(1991) (“The Court . . . has interpreted content discrimination quite narrowly as involving a particular type 
of government purpose served by the regulation of speech.”). 
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purposes of this sort. It has insisted that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or 
purposes are a hazardous matter” and one that judges are ill-suited to perform.27  
As a result, the Court has generally refused to engage in a direct analysis of 
discriminatory intent. Instead, it has attempted to identify discrimination indirectly, by 
analyzing the “fit” between the ends the government claims a particular law advances and 
the means chosen to advance those ends. It has insisted that laws that reveal a very poor 
fit between statutory means and ends should be struck down—even in cases where the 
poor fit results from the narrowness of the statutory prohibition, not its breadth.28 
Underinclusive speech regulations are considered as suspect as overinclusive speech 
regulations, the Court has explained, because, in both cases, what the poorness of the fit 
between the statute’s means and ends produces is doubt about the credibility of the 
government’s purported motivations.29  
This indirect approach to the analysis of discrimination provides an elegant 
solution to the problems created by the fact-finding limitations of judges. It also has the 
benefit of making it difficult for the government to restrict speech even when its actions 
are not in fact motivated by dislike of the targeted speech but are instead merely the 
product of carelessness or laziness, or political expediency on the legislature’s part.30 
This is because in all cases, what the government must demonstrate in order to justify the 
restriction of constitutionally protected speech is the existence of a substantial or, at least, 
a legitimate state interest—and the Court has made clear that administrative convenience 
does not qualify as an interest of this sort.31  
The approach has a significant drawback, however. Because it operates 
prophylactically, it may be used to invalidate laws that are not in fact a product of 
discriminatory purpose, nor the consequence of legislative laziness or political self-
interest. Depending on how tight a fit between means and ends is required, it may in fact 
make it extremely difficult for the government to ever justify regulating speech. This is a 
problem because, as the Court has long recognized, speech regulations can further 
important constitutional, as well as extra-constitutional, goals, by creating the conditions 
under which individuals can effectively utilize their free speech rights, and by protecting 
the “safety and convenience” of the people.32 Even if the ability of the government to 
                                                            
27 United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 383–84 (1968). 
28 Cases in which the Court struck down laws that failed to apply broadly enough include Florida 
Star v B.J.F., 491 US 524 (1989); Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 465 (1980); Mosley, 408 US at 96. 
29 Gilleo, 512 US at 51–52 (“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of 
speech . . . may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first 
place. . . . [A]n exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a 
governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views 
to the people.”).  
30 Id at 51. 
31 Mosley, 408 US at 102 n 9; Schneider v New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 US 147, 151 (1939) 
(“Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support 
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise 
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”).  
32 As the Court put it in Cox: “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the 
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the 
excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the 
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent 
with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they 
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regulate is not entirely foreclosed, a very high fit requirement grants judges a great deal 
of power to second-guess legislative choices, and thus threatens what the Court has 
recognized in the post-Lochner era to be an important value: namely, the regulatory 
autonomy of the democratically elected legislature.33  
The Court has been unwilling as a result to construe the First Amendment to 
require a very close fit between means and ends in all cases in which the government 
restricts protected expression. Instead, in most cases involving the regulation of speech, it 
requires only that the fit between statutory means and statutory ends be a reasonable one.  
Hence, when the government regulates speech in limited or nonpublic forums—that is, in 
spaces and institutions that have not traditionally served as important sites for the public 
expression of ideas—the Court requires only that the restrictions the government imposes 
on expression are “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”34 What this 
means is that the government may not restrict speech because it dislikes its viewpoint or 
its ideas, but it may reserve the forum “for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion 
of certain subjects.”35 Similarly, when the government restricts speech by government 
employees, the Court has made clear that it need only show that the restriction serves a 
legitimate workplace goal and that the government’s interest in regulating the speech 
outweighs the employee’s interest in speaking.36 The Court applies even more lenient 
review to the regulation of the private workplace.37 
The Court applies more stringent scrutiny when the government regulates speech 
that takes place in the public forum—that is, on government property that has 
traditionally or by design been used for the public expression of ideas.38 It also applies 
more stringent scrutiny when the government regulates speech on private property that 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ultimately depend.” 312 US at 574. The suggestion here is that governmental regulation of the public 
sphere may not only be constitutional; it may be constitutionally required. 
33See, for example, United States v Albertini, 472 US 675, 689 (1985) (arguing that the 
constitutionality of speech regulations “does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible 
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests”); 
Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288, 299 (1984) (rejecting lower court decision 
striking down park service regulation preventing protestors from sleeping in two national parks because 
“[w]e do not believe . . . that [the First Amendment] assign[s] to the judiciary the authority to replace the 
Park Service as the manager of the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge 
how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained”). 
34 Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc, 473 US 788, 806 (1985). 
35 Id at 802 (citing Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 
45, 46 n 7 (1983)).  
36 Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410, 418 (2006) (citing Pickering v Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205, Will County, Ill, 391 US 563, 568 (1968)) (noting that, when a public 
employee speaks on matters of public concern, “[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government 
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the 
general public”).  
37 See, for example, Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited 
Expression, 43 Md L Rev 4 (1984); James Q. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: 
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 Hastings Const L Q 189 (1984); Robert Post, Informed Consent to 
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U Ill L Rev 939, 949 (2007); 
Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 Seton 
Hall L Rev 42 (1987). 
38 Perry Education Association, 460 US at 45. 
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addresses itself to the public sphere.39 This is because it recognizes that the government 
has fewer legitimate reasons to regulate the public sphere than to regulate the private.40 
Hence, the risk that when it does regulate, it does so to achieve impermissible ends, is 
greater. 
Even in such cases, however, the Court imposes only a relatively modest burden 
of justification when the government regulates speech in a content-neutral manner. In 
such cases, the Court requires only that the regulation “promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,” that it 
does so by means that are neither significantly overbroad nor significantly underbroad, 
and that it leave open adequate alternative channels for those impacted by it to 
communicate.41   
The Court imposes a much heavier burden of justification when the government 
engages in the content-based regulation of speech—at least high-value speech. For 
decades now, the Court has insisted that regulations that restrict high-value speech 
because of its content are “presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment.42 As a 
result, they can be upheld only if the government can satisfy strict scrutiny by 
demonstrating that the regulation advances a compelling interest by the least restrictive 
means available.43 This is a demanding standard; and one the government usually has 
trouble satisfying.44 
The Court has explained that strict scrutiny is necessary because of the significant 
risk that content-based speech regulations either are the product of, or can be used to 
further, discriminatory purposes. As Justice Powell noted in Consolidated Edison Co of 
New York v Public Service Commission of New York45 in 1980: “[W]hen regulation is 
based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully 
[than in other cases] to ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely 
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’”46 The implication, of course, is 
that regulations that are not “based on the content of the speech” are subject to less 
                                                            
39 See, for example, Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981); Erznoznik v City of 
Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 211–12 (1975). 
40 Compare Garcetti, 547 US at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little 
chance for the efficient provision of public services.”) and Adderley v Fla, 385 US 39, 47 (1966) (“The 
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated.’’) with Mosley, 408 US at 96 (“[G]overnment may not grant the use 
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored 
or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public 
facilities. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not 
prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.”).   
41 Ward, 491 US at 797–800.  
42 Playboy, 529 US at 817 (citing R.A.V., 505 US at 382). 
43 Playboy, 529 US at 813. 
44 Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1293 (cited in note 15). In a recent survey of content neutrality 
cases in the lower federal courts, Kreimer found that, at least in cases involving the regulation of public 
forums, content-based restrictions were struck down 97 percent of the district court cases and 87 percent of 
court of appeals case. Id. In contrast, he found that laws deemed content-neutral were struck down only 28 
percent of the time in the district court cases and 56 percent of the time in the court of appeals. Id.  
45 447 US 530 (1980). 
46 Id at 536. 
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careful scrutiny because they pose less of a risk that they were enacted “merely because 
public officials disapprove of the speakers’ views.” 
By requiring a higher burden of justification in cases in which it is more likely 
that invidious purposes are at work and a lesser burden of justification in cases in which 
this is less likely the case, the Court has attempted to effectively enforce the prohibition 
against discriminatory speech regulations without unduly limiting the government’s 
regulatory power. This is an obviously worthy goal. Nevertheless, it is one that has 
proven, in practice, extremely hard to implement, given serious and pervasive 
disagreement on the Court about how broadly the prophylactic instrument of strict 
scrutiny should apply. 
 
A. The Fight Over the Meaning of Content-Based Lawmaking 
  
For decades now, scholars have complained about the “[p]rofound problems [that] 
plague the . . . use of the judicially created categories of content-neutral and content-
based speech regulations and orders.”47 They have argued that the distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral laws that the cases draw is “inconsistent” and prone to 
manipulation.48 They have blamed this on the results-oriented nature of the Court’s 
jurisprudence and its theoretical incoherency. 49  In fact, much of the doctrinal 
inconsistency that scholars have identified can be blamed on the significant, and 
persistent, disagreement among members of the Court about how broadly the 
presumption against content-based lawmaking should apply.  
Some on the Court have argued that the presumption should apply broadly: that 
strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for all speech regulations that make 
regulatory distinctions that turn on the content of speech. This is because, they have 
argued, laws of this kind are more likely than other kinds of laws to be used for “thought-
control purposes” given the power they give the government to target ideas or messages 
or topics it dislikes. Justice Scalia made this argument, for example, in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Madsen v Women’s Health Center: “The danger of content-based 
statutory restrictions upon speech,” Scalia wrote, “is that they may be designed and used 
precisely to suppress the ideas in question rather than to achieve any other proper 
governmental aim.”50 The fact that laws of this sort “lend [themselves] . . . readily to the 
targeted suppression of particular ideas . . . render[] [them] deserving of the high standard 
of strict scrutiny.”51  
Other members of the Court have argued for a narrower application of strict 
scrutiny.   Justice Stevens, for example, argued that because there are many legitimate 
                                                            
47 Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly 
Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L Rev 69, 71 (1997). 
48 McDonald, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 4). See also Robert Post, Recuperating 
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan L Rev 1249, 1265 (1995) (“Whatever the ultimate merits of a First 
Amendment focus on content neutrality, the Court’s doctrinal elaboration of [it] has been haphazard, 
internally incoherent, and for these reasons inconsistent with any possible principled concern for content 
neutrality.”); Williams, 139 U Pa L Rev at 616 (cited in note 26) (“The doctrinal web surrounding the free 
speech clause of the [F]irst [A]mendment is one of the most complicated and confusing in constitutional 
law.”). 
49 McDonald, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1353 (cited in note 4). 
 50 Madsen, 512 US at 792 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
51 Id at 793–94 (emphasis omitted). 
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reasons why the government might want to distinguish between speakers based on the 
content of their speech, a rule that subjected all facially content-based laws to strict 
scrutiny would intrude too much on the government’s legitimate regulatory powers.52 He 
argued that strict scrutiny should therefore apply only when there was some reason to 
suspect that the government’s motivations for acting were improper. This was always the 
case, Justice Stevens argued, when the purposes the government invoked to justify the 
law were constitutionally prohibited—such as, for example, when the government 
enacted a law in order “to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial 
issues of general interest.”53 In other cases, however, Stevens argued that strict scrutiny 
was only appropriate when there was some evidence that the “regulation [was] biased in 
favor of one point of view or another, or [provided the government] . . . a subtle method 
of regulating the controversial subjects that may be placed on the agenda for public 
debate[.]”54 But the mere fact that a law made content-based distinctions did not, he 
insisted, mean that it should be treated as a presumptively invalid “content-based” 
regulation of speech.55 
In different cases, these different points of view managed to persuade a shifting 
majority of the Court. The result was the creation of two distinct and inconsistent tests of 
content-based lawmaking.  
In one line of cases, the Court employed the strict test of content-based 
lawmaking that Justice Scalia advocated. That is to say, it treated laws that made facial 
content distinctions as necessarily content-based. In Burson v Freeman,56 for example, 
the Court concluded that a Tennessee law that prohibited election-related speech near 
polling places was content-based because “[w]hether individuals may exercise their free 
speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a 
political campaign.”57 In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc v Ragland, the Court similarly 
held that a state tax law that taxed magazines but exempted “religious, professional, trade 
and sports journals” from the tax was content-based because the law required state 
officials to “examine the content of the message . . . conveyed” by the magazine to 
determine whether it was subject to the tax.58 And in Simon & Schuster, Inc v Members of 
New York State Crime Victims Board,59 the Court concluded that a New York law that 
                                                            
 52 See, for example, R.A.V., 505 US at 420 (Stevens concurring) (arguing that “[a]lthough the 
Court has, on occasion, declared that content-based regulations of speech are ‘never permitted’ . . . our 
decisions demonstrate that content-based distinctions . . . are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a 
coherent understanding of the First Amendment”); Consolidated Edison Co, 447 US at 545–46 (Stevens 
concurring) (“There are . . . many situations in which the subject matter, or, indeed, even the point of view 
of the speaker, may provide a justification for a time, place, and manner regulation [of speech]. . . . As is 
true of many other aspects of liberty, some forms of orderly regulation actually promote freedom more than 
would a state of total anarchy.”). 
53 Id at 546. 
54 Metromedia, Inc, 453 US at 552 (Stevens dissenting in part). 
 55 Consolidated Edison Co, 447 US at 545–46.  
56 504 US 191 (1992). 
57 Id at 197. 
58 481 US at 229–30.  
59 502 US 105 (1991). 
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prohibited convicted felons from making a profit off stories of their crimes was content-
based because it was “directed only at works with a specified content.”60 
In another line of cases, the Court employed instead the more purpose-oriented 
test of content-based lawmaking that Justice Stevens championed. In this line of cases, 
the Court insisted that speech regulations were content-based when, but only when, they 
could not be “justified without reference to the content of the speech they regulated.”61 
Although, as we shall see later, what precisely this meant varied over time, in its most 
rigorous form, the Court interpreted this test to require it to first look at the purposes the 
government claimed the regulation furthered. If these purposes evinced a concern with 
the communicative effects of the speech—that is to say, if they evinced a concern with 
the effect of the expression of its ideas or messages on an audience—the Court concluded 
that the risk that the government was acting because it disliked the speech, or for some 
other impermissible reason, was sufficiently great to warrant strict scrutiny and 
accordingly deemed the law content-based.62 If not, the Court examined whether there 
was evidence that the purposes the government invoked to justify the law were actually 
furthered by the distinctions it drew.63 If there was, the Court treated the law as content-
neutral; if not, it treated the law as content-based.64 
Although these two lines of cases could easily be reconciled when it came to 
facially content-neutral laws—in such cases, the Court rather unproblematically applied 
the “justified without reference to the content of speech” test65—they could not be easily 
reconciled when it came to facially content-based laws. Consider, for example, City of 
                                                            
60 Id at 116. Other cases in which the Court concluded that a law was content-based on the basis of 
an analysis of its text alone include McCullen v Coakley, 134 S Ct 2518, 2525 (2014); Republican Party of 
Minnesota v White, 536 US 765, 770 (2002); Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US 1, 27 (2010); 
McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334 (1995); Leathers v Medlock, 499 US 439, 449 (1991); 
Regan, 468 US at 648. 
 61 Cases stating this as the test of content discrimination include Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 564 US 
552, 566 (2011); Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001); Hill, 530 US 703; Playboy, 529 U.S. 803; City of 
Erie v Pap’s A.M., 529 US 277, 294 (2000); Madsen, 512 US 753; City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, 
Inc, 507 US 410 (1993); Ward, 491 US 781; Boos v Barry, 485 US 312 (1988). 
 62 In Boos v Barry, for example, the Court concluded that a DC law that prohibited the display of 
signs within 500 feet of foreign embassies that “tend[ed] to bring that foreign government into ‘public 
odium’” was content-based not because it applied differently to speakers based on the messages they 
communicated but because the purpose the government invoked to justify “focuse[d] only on the content of 
the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners” rather than on other, secondary effects, 
such as “congestion . . . [or] the need to protect the security of embassies.” 485 US at 316, 321. See also 
Playboy, 529 US at 811 (holding that a law requiring cable providers to scramble channels dedicated to 
sexually oriented programming was content-based because “[t]he overriding justification for the regulation 
is concern for the effect of the subject matter on young viewers.”). 
63 Discovery Network, 507 US at 42 (requiring the city to establish some empirical “basis” for the 
distinctions it drew).   
64 Id at 428 (concluding that “the absence of some basis for distinguishing between ‘newspapers’ 
and ‘commercial handbills’ that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city” meant that a law that 
distinguished between the two kinds of speech was not “justified without reference to the content. . .”). See 
also Erznoznik, 422 US at 214–15 (concluding that a regulation that prohibited the showing of nudity in 
places viewable from the public road could not be adequately justified by the city’s interest in traffic safety 
given no evidence that speech involving nudity was more distracting to drivers than “a wide variety of 
other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to violence”) (quotation marks omitted).  
65 See, for example, Bartnicki, 532 US at 526; Ward, 491 US at 791; Clark, 468 US at 293. 
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Renton v Playtime Theatres, Inc, 66 a case in which the Court held that a zoning ordinance 
that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residences, 
churches, parks, or schools was content-neutral even though the law identified adult 
movie theatres by reference to the content of the movies they exhibited.67 The Court 
acknowledged that the law made distinctions based on the content of speech but 
nevertheless concluded that strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review 
because the law “aimed not at the content of the films shown [by adult movie theaters] 
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.”68 
Because the purpose of the ordinance, the Court found, was to “prevent the crime, protect 
the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally protect and preserve the 
quality of the city's neighborhoods, . . . not to suppress the expression of unpopular 
views,” and because the Court found that the city council had a reasonable basis for its 
beliefs that the speech it restricted differed in a relevant way from the speech it left 
unrestricted, the majority concluded that the ordinance was “completely consistent with 
our definition of content-neutral speech regulations as those that are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”69  
Justice Brennan wrote an impassioned dissent in which he argued that, because 
the ordinance “selectively imposes limitations on the location of a movie theater based 
exclusively on the content of the films shown there,” it could not be treated as a content-
neutral regulation of speech.70 And indeed, the holding in Renton is impossible to 
reconcile with the various precedents in which the Court had insisted that laws were 
content-based whenever their application depended upon “the nature of the message . . .  
conveyed” by the speech they regulated.71   
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, the Court continued to construe as content-
neutral laws that made content distinctions on their face but that it found to be adequately 
justified by a content-neutral purpose.72 In other cases, however, it continued to insist that 
laws were content-based if their application “depend[ed] on what [individuals] say.”73  
The persistence of these two distinct and inconsistent tests of content-based 
lawmaking in the Court’s First Amendment cases created a very confusing, and 
contentious body of law. As Seth Kreimer noted in 2014, members of the Supreme Court 
                                                            
66 475 US 41. 
 67 Id at 47. 
68 Id (emphasis in original).  
69 Id at 48 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). See also id at 50-52 (noting detailed 
evidence of the harm of adult movie theatres that the City Council relied upon when it enacted the law). 
 70 Id at 55 (Brennan dissenting). 
 71 Regan, 468 US at 648; see also Carey, 447 US at 462 (concluding that a law was content-based 
because “it is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt 
prohibition”). 
 72 See, for example, Alameda Books, 535 US at 431–32 (concluding that a law that prohibited the 
establishment of more than one adult bookstore or video arcade in the same building could be considered 
content-neutral); Hill, 530 US at 703–04 (concluding that law that prohibited “oral protest, education, or 
counseling” near the entrance to abortion clinics was content-neutral because it was not “adopted because 
of disagreement with the message [the speech it regulated conveys]”); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US at 
793 n 1 (construing as content-neutral a law that prohibited the posting of any handbill or signs on public 
property, but exempted from the ban “metal plaque[s] or plate[s] . . . commemorating an historical, cultural, 
or artistic event, location or personality for which the Board of Public Works, with the approval of the 
Council, has granted a written permit”).  
73 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US at 27. 
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“regularly [fell] into acrimonious disputes” about whether laws were content-based or 
content neutral—frequently because of disagreement about which test to apply—and a  
“similar perplexity . . . afflicted the lower courts.”74 Indeed, on multiple occasions, 
different courts—and sometimes different members of the same court—applied different 
tests of content-based lawmaking to reach opposite conclusions about the content 
neutrality, or lack thereof, of the same or very similar laws.75 Even the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content 
neutral [was] not always a simple task.”76 
 
B.  Reed and the Turn Away from Purposes 
 
The decision two terms ago in Reed can be understood as an attempt, by at least 
some members of the Court, to finally resolve the endemic confusion that has plagued the 
content discrimination cases by asserting explicitly what no prior opinion had: namely, 
that all laws that employ content classifications trigger strict scrutiny, no matter what 
purposes the government invokes to justify them and no matter how innocuous they may 
seem. 
The case involved a municipal sign ordinance promulgated by the small town of 
Gilbert, Arizona.77 The ordinance imposed a general permit requirement on those who 
wished to erect signs within the city limits but it exempted twenty-three types of signs 
from the requirement, including “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying 
Event,” “Political Signs,” and “Ideological Signs.”78 To qualify for the exemption, a sign 
not only had to fall into one of the exempt categories; it also had to comply with the 
detailed restrictions the ordinance imposed on the display of each type of exempted sign. 
These restrictions varied in severity. To qualify as a Temporary Directional Sign Relating 
to a Qualifying Event, for example, a sign had to direct viewers to an event organized by 
a religious, charitable, or other non-profit group, be no more than six square feet in size, 
and to be put up no more than twelve hours before and be taken down no more than one 
hour after the event it gave directions to ended.79 In contrast, Political Signs (defined as 
“temporary sign[s] designed to influence the outcome of an election called by a public 
                                                            
74 Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1269–70 (cited in note 15). 
75 Compare Norton v City of Springfield, Ill, 768 F3d 713, 714 (7th Cir 2014) (holding that a city 
ordinance that prohibited panhandling—which it defined as “an oral request for an immediate donation of 
money”—was content neutral because it did not target specific ideas or reflect governmental disapproval of 
a message), with ACLU of Nev v City of Las Vegas, 466 F3d 784, 788, 796 (9th Cir 2006) (quotation marks 
omitted) (holding city policy that made it illegal “to ask, beg, solicit or plead . . . for the purpose of 
obtaining money” was content-based because “[u]nder the city’s . . . policy, whether any particular 
[communication] falls within the ban is determined by the content of the [communication]”); compare Reed 
v Town of Gilbert, Ariz, 707 F3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir 2013) (concluding that the Gilbert sign code was a 
reasonable content-neutral regulation of speech that was “adequately justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech”) with id at 1079 (Watford dissenting) (holding that Gilbert sign code 
“violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by drawing content-based distinctions among different 
categories of non-commercial speech”). 
76 Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 642 (1994). 
77 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2224. 
78 Id. 
79 Id at 2225. 
 14 
body”) could be up to thirty-two square feet and could be displayed up to sixty days 
before a primary election, and up to fifteen days following a general election.80  
The law treated speakers differently, in other words, based on the content of their 
speech. Nevertheless, both the district court and Ninth Circuit concluded that the law was 
a content-neutral regulation of speech because it could be justified without reference to 
the speech it regulated.81  
Justice Thomas, writing for six members of the Court, rejected the lower courts’ 
conclusion that the sign ordinance was content-neutral, as well the test of content 
discrimination they employed to reach this result. “Government regulation of speech is 
content based,” he wrote, “if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic 
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”82 Therefore, because the Gilbert law applied 
different rules to signs depending on the topic or idea or message they expressed, the 
Court “ha[d] no need to consider the government's justifications or purposes . . . to 
determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”83  
 Thomas acknowledged that in earlier cases the Court had looked at the 
government’s purposes to determine whether laws were content-based but insisted that 
these cases dealt with an entirely “separate and additional category of laws”—namely, 
laws that did not make subject matter or viewpoint-based distinctions on their face (that 
were, as he put it, “facially content neutral”).84 But laws that “appl[y] to particular speech 
because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” Thomas insisted, are 
“subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral 
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”85 
Therefore the “crucial first step” courts have to employ when confronted with a First 
Amendment challenge to a law is to look at the face of the law and determine whether it 
makes either “subtle” or “obvious” content distinctions.86 Only if the statute does not 
make these kinds of facial content distinctions, Thomas explained, should the court 
proceed to the second step of the analysis and look at the purposes the government 
invoked to justify the law.87 
 By insisting that the “justified without reference” test applied only to facially 
content-neutral laws, the opinion finally provided lower courts what they had been 
missing: namely, clear instructions on what to do when faced with facially content-based 
laws. What this required, however, was the implicit overruling of the multiple decisions 
in which the Court had done precisely what the Reed majority asserted it never had: 
namely, construed facially content-based laws as content neutral because of the purposes 
that justified them.88 What Reed means, going forward, is that it will be much more 
                                                            
80 Id at 2224–25.  
 81 Reed, 707 F3d at 1069–72 (affirming 832 F Supp 2d 1070, 1078 (D Ariz 2011)). 
 82 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2227.  
 83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id at 2228. 
86 Id at 2227.   
87 Id.  
88 Besides Renton, decisions that fall into this category include City of Los Angeles v Alameda 
Books, Inc, 535 US 425 (2002), Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703 (2000), and Members of City Council of City 
of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789 (1984). 
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difficult than previously for the government to defend facially content-based regulations 
of speech against constitutional challenge.  
 The decision thus raises anew the question that has been simmering for more than 
three decades: namely, does Reed’s approach better advance First Amendment interests 
than the alternative, “justified without reference” standard? Answering this question turns 
out to be quite difficult. In the next Part, I examine the advantages of the Reed approach 
and I then turn in Part III to an examination of its costs.  
 
II.  REED’S VIRTUES 
  
 The case for the Reed test is an easy one to make. It is absolutely true, as Justice 
Scalia argued on multiple occasions, that laws that treat speakers differently because of 
the ideas or messages or subject matter of their speech “lend themselves” to invidious 
uses.89 This is because content distinctions give the government the power to target only 
those specific ideas or messages or topics it dislikes. They thus lower the costs of 
repression, by making it possible for the government to repress only the speech of its 
enemies and not the speech of its friends.90 They provide in other words an attractive 
vehicle for advancing constitutionally prohibited purposes. 
 Certainly there are plenty of examples of facially content-based laws that have 
been used to repress speech because the government disliked it or feared its effect on an 
audience.91 The history of speech regulation in the United States thus provides vivid 
testament to the dangers inherent in facially content-based lawmaking. And the 
willingness of courts to uphold, in various circumstances, laws that targeted the speech of 
communists, radicals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other groups on what seem to us today to 
                                                            
89 Hill, 530 US at 743 (quoting Madsen, 512 US at 794) (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“‘The vice of content-based legislation—what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict 
scrutiny—is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use 
for those purposes.’ A restriction that operates only on speech that communicates a message of protest, 
education, or counseling presents exactly this risk.”). 
90 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189, 
230–31 (1983) (“[T]he probability that an improper motivation has tainted a decision to restrict expression 
is far greater when the restriction is directed at a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information than 
when it is content-neutral . . . for government officials considering the adoption of such a restriction will 
almost invariably have their own opinions about the merits of the restricted speech. . .”). 
91 The complex network of oath laws and loyalty tests that emerged across the United States in the 
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s and that played a tremendously important role in the distribution of welfare 
benefits and jobs during that period provides a good example of how viewpoint-based laws have been used 
in the past to stigmatize and marginalize unpopular speakers. See generally Ralph S. Brown Jr, Loyalty and 
Security: Employment Tests in the United States (1958). Laws that required teachers, doctors, civil 
servants, and the like to disavow radical political beliefs, or to submit to tests of their loyalty, were justified 
by the pressing needs of national security. In practice, however, they functioned equally well if not better to 
stigmatize those who, because of their sexuality, their political leanings or their lifestyle, appeared to those 
who enforced these laws to be “un-American.” See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the 
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S Cal L Rev 1083, 1111 (2002). Content-based laws have 
also been used to suppress the speech of Jehovah’s Witnesses, radical abolitionists, and Socialists—to 
name only a few of the unpopular groups targeted by facially content-based laws. See generally Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 
(2005). 
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be reed-thin pretexts provide a good example of how easily judges can be persuaded to 
acquiesce in the repressive impulses of legislatures.92   
 The bright-line test of content-based lawmaking that Reed announced appears, at 
least at first glance, to provide a more effective means of constraining the repressive and 
censorial impulses of both legislators and judges than the alternative, more complicated 
justification test the Reed majority rejected, at least as applied to facially content-based 
laws. This is because, by making the statutory text the primary determinant of the level of 
scrutiny, it limits the ability of courts to afford stricter scrutiny to laws they dislike and 
lesser scrutiny to laws they like. It vests courts with less discretion than does a test that 
requires courts to evaluate whether the government’s purposes are adequately justified 
before determining the standard of scrutiny that applies. As a result, it makes it harder for 
courts to apply a lower standard of scrutiny in cases in which they are sympathetic to the 
government. 
Of course, no test is entirely foolproof. Judicial power carries with it inherent 
discretion, and the tiered system of scrutiny provides particular room for maneuver. As 
the Court’s own cases reveal, what it means for a law to be narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling interest, or to serve a significant interest by reasonably tailored means, can 
vary considerably from case to case.93 Furthermore, in Reed’s wake, courts retain 
considerable discretion to determine how broadly the decision applies, although this 
discretion may ultimately be limited by the articulation of clear rules.94 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to understand why a majority of the Court believed 
that a bright-line test of content-based lawmaking would provide better protection against 
judges’ and legislator’s worst impulses than the alternative. This is particularly the case 
given plenty of evidence that, prior to Reed, lower courts frequently applied the “justified 
without reference” test in a manner that was excessively deferential to government 
interests. Rather than requiring the government to provide evidence that the content 
distinctions it drew actually furthered the purposes it invoked to justify the law, courts 
frequently took the government’s claims of statutory purpose at face value.  
The lower court opinion in Reed provides a good example of how little evidence 
courts sometimes required to conclude that a law that made facial content distinctions 
was adequately justified by a content-neutral purpose.  In her concurring opinion in Reed, 
Justice Kagan argued that the arguments the town of Gilbert provided to explain why 
directional signs were treated differently from political signs and ideological signs were 
                                                            
92 For an excellent analysis of judges’ willingness to “vastly exaggerate and react against the 
threats posed by disfavored groups,” see Christina Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-
Making, 2005 Wisc L Rev 115, 119 (2005). See also Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1309  (cited in note 15) 
(“A robust line of research demonstrates that decision makers are less willing to accord weight to free 
speech principles when they feel threatened by the ideology or actions of the groups at issue.”). 
93 Compare for example the Court’s very lenient application of strict scrutiny in Burson v 
Freeman, 504 US 191 (1992), with its very rigorous application of strict scrutiny in Ashcroft v ACLU, 535 
US 564 (2002). 
 94 Justice Thomas’s opinion in Reed failed almost entirely to specify in what circumstances the 
decision applied. Reed, 135 S Ct at 2227 (noting simply that “[g]overnment regulation of speech is content 
based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed” 
and that content-based regulations are “subject to strict scrutiny”). This has led to considerable debate 
among the lower courts about the scope of the rule—and for reasons I discuss below—has led some courts 
to read it quite narrowly. See generally Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v Town of Gilbert, 129 
Harv L Rev 1981, 1990–92 (2016) (noting that courts have distinguished Reed “up, down, and sideways.”). 
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so weak they couldn’t pass the “laugh test,” let alone strict or intermediate scrutiny.95 The 
town failed entirely, for example, to explain why only four such signs could be placed on 
any given private property.96 The only argument the town could come up to explain why 
temporary directional signs had to be so much smaller than other signs was that they had 
“to direct travelers along a route.”97 But of course one would think precisely the opposite 
would be the case. Meanwhile the only argument the town provided to explain why 
directional signs had to be taken down within one hour after the event they advertised had 
concluded, but election-related signs could stay up for ten days after the election they 
advertised had concluded, and ideological signs never had to be taken down at all, was 
that “Ideological Signs and Political Signs . . . retain expressive value” even when they 
advertise a completed event and moreover “do not have the same potential to confuse 
travelers because [they do not provide] guidance to a specific location for a time-sensitive 
event.”98 It is far from clear, however, why a sign advertising a now-concluded religious 
meeting should prove any less expressively meaningful or more confusing than a sign 
advertising a now-concluded election. Nor did the town provide any evidence to back up 
its claim that directional signs had more potential to confuse travelers than other kinds of 
signs.99 
Notwithstanding the problems with the arguments the town made to justify the 
law, both the district court and two panels of the Ninth Circuit held that the Gilbert sign 
ordinance was adequately justified by the town’s interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. 
The lower courts were untroubled by the logical problems with the town’s arguments that 
Kagan identified because they did not encounter them. Rather than asking the town to 
explain why it drew the distinctions it did, the lower courts asked only whether the 
restrictions the sign code imposed on directional signs could be plausibly justified by 
traffic safety and aesthetic concerns. The Ninth Circuit concluded, for example, that the 
size restrictions the law imposed on the display of temporary directional signs “actually 
advance[d]” the town’s aesthetic and safety interests because they did “not appear 
substantially broader … than required to make sure the rights-of-way are not so thicketed 
with signs as to pose a safety hazard or create an aesthetic blight.”100 At no point, 
however, did the court require the town to explain why political and ideological signs—
which were allowed to be considerably larger than directional signs—did not pose an 
equivalent threat to rights-of-way to cause the same problems.101 Nor did it require the 
                                                            
95 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2239 (Kagan concurring). 
96 Id.  
97 Oral Argument, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Ariz, Docket No 13-502, *40 (US filed Jan 12, 2015) 
(available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 2399396).  
98 Brief for Respondents, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Ariz, Docket No 13-502, *48–49 (US filed Nov 
14, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 6466937). 
99 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2232 (Kagan concurring) (“The Town similarly has not shown that limiting 
temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate threats to traffic safety, but that limiting other types of 
signs is not. The Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs pose a greater threat to safety 
than do ideological or political signs. If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to 
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church meeting.”). 
100 Reed v Town of Gilbert, Ariz, 587 F3d 966, 980 (9th Cir 2009). 
101 Id.  
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town to produce any empirical evidence that directional signs posed the problems it said 
they did.102 
The Ninth Circuit failed to ask whether the distinctions the Sign Code drew were 
justified because it found that the signs that fell into each of the exempted categories 
were “not in competition” with one another and that “the erection of one type of 
temporary sign does not preclude the placement of another.”103 But this is to mistake the 
nature of the inquiry: what the analysis of the government’s justifications for 
distinguishing between different kinds of speakers and different kinds of speech seeks to 
ensure is not that those engaged in direct competition in the marketplace of ideas are 
treated equally but instead that the government has legitimate reasons for acting as it 
does. The Ninth Circuit’s application of the justified without reference test entirely failed 
to achieve this aim. 
The Ninth Circuit opinion is a striking but by no means exceptionally egregious 
example of how leniently courts applied the justified without reference test in the years 
prior to the Court’s decision in Reed. Courts engaged in a similarly cursory analysis of 
the government’s justifications in many other cases. In Thorburn v Austin, 104  for 
example, the Eighth Circuit held that a local law that prohibited the targeted picketing of 
residences—and defined targeted picketing to mean picketing that was “directed towards 
a specific person or persons”—was content-neutral because the city’s justification for the 
law (namely, that it protected residential privacy and tranquility) had “nothing to do with 
the content of the regulated speech.”105 The Court reached this conclusion even though 
the city provided no evidence that targeted picketing posed a greater threat to residential 
privacy and tranquility than other kinds of picketing, let alone evidence demonstrating 
that it posed a greater threat to residential privacy for reasons other than the presumably 
personal messages it conveyed.  
Similarly, in, Norton v City of Springfield,106 the Seventh Circuit held that a city 
law that prohibited panhandling—which it defined as the oral request for an immediate 
donation of money—was content-neutral because it did not, on its face, distinguish 
between speakers based on their viewpoint or message.107 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court presumed that the distinction the law drew between oral requests for the immediate 
donation of money and other kinds of oral requests was justified by the city’s interest in 
protecting its residents against a particularly intrusive and disruptive kind of speech.108 
But neither the court, nor the city, pointed to any evidence that panhandling, as the city 
defined it, in fact posed any significant threat to the wellbeing of pedestrians in the 
downtown area, or any more threat than other kinds of speech.109 Absent this kind of 
                                                            
102 In a later opinion, the Ninth Circuit did analyze whether the distinction the code drew between 
commercial and noncommercial speech was adequately justified, but its analysis was again extremely 
cursory. Reed, 707 F3d at 1074 (noting that “courts generally defer to a city’s determinations of size and 
duration”).  
103 Reed, 707 F3d at 1075. 
104 231 F3d 1114 (8th Cir 2000). 
105 Id at 1117. 
106 678 F3d 713. 
107 Id at 717. 
108 Id at 714. 
 109 The closest the city’s brief came to an assertion of this fact was its claim that solicitation “is 
unquestionably a particular form of speech that is disruptive of business.” Brief of the Defendant-Appellee, 
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evidence, the court had no way of telling whether the city enacted the ordinance for the 
purposes it claimed or instead did so to suppress unpopular speech. 
 By accepting the government’s justifications at face value, courts—in these and 
other cases--essentially allowed the government to determine, through artful pleading, the 
standard of review that applied to its speech regulations. The effect, as Mark Rienzi and 
Stuart Buck noted critically, was to make the “justified without reference” test “a shallow 
and easily evaded inquiry into whether the government [could] name just one neutral 
purpose served by the law.”110  
Given this shoddy record, one can well understand why, after decades of 
vacillation on the question of what makes a law content-based, the Court was no longer 
willing to put up with the “justified without reference” test, at least as applied to facially 
content-based laws.  And to the extent the rule announced in Reed makes it harder for the 
government to “make an end run around the First Amendment” than was the case under 
the pre-Reed regime, the decision represents a doctrinal step forward.111  
 The benefits that Reed produces, however, come with serious costs. This is 
because, by requiring courts to treat all facially content-based laws as presumptively 
invalid—at least to the extent they regulate speech to which the presumption against 
content-based regulation applies—the decision will make it very difficult for the 
government to defend even entirely legitimate laws against constitutional challenge. This 
is because, although the Court has sometimes described the purpose of strict scrutiny to 
be the “smok[ing] out [of] illegitimate [government purposes],” in fact the prophylactic 
rule does much more than that.112 By requiring the government to demonstrate a 
compelling and not just a legitimate purpose, and that the means it has chosen to achieve 
that end are the least restrictive possible, strict scrutiny makes it difficult to defend even 
laws that are not the product of a bad intent. 113 The result is that Reed may imperil many 
laws that employ content distinctions to achieve entirely legitimate aims. In this respect, 
Reed extends the prophylactic rule of strict scrutiny further than the Court in other 
contexts has been willing to go. The analogy to the law of race discrimination illuminates 
just how broad the Reed test truly is.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Norton v City of Springfield, Docket No 13-3581, *11 (7th Cir filed Feb 11, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 
2014 WL 688306). This assertion was unsupported by any evidence, however.  
110 Mark Rienzi and Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects Analysis and the Quiet 
Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 Fordham L Rev 1187, 1191 (2013). 
111 Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: The Constitutionality of Restricting Witness Speech, 
38 Ariz L Rev 291 (1996). 
112 Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 226 (1995) (quoting City of Richmond v J.A. 
Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493 (1989) (plurality)). 
113 This is of course why Gerald Gunther famously quipped that strict scrutiny was “fatal in fact, if 
not in theory.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972). Although later empirical work has suggested that 
strict scrutiny is not always fatal, Seth Kreimer’s analysis of lower court decisions in content discrimination 
cases makes clear how frequently fatal it can be. Compare Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in 
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand L Rev 793, 815 (2006) 
(reporting reports of empirical study finding that courts applying strict scrutiny in First Amendment cases 
upheld the challenged law in 22 percent of cases) with Kreimer, 16 U Pa J Const L at 1293 (cited in note 
15) (finding that, in cases involving the regulation of speech in public forums, laws subjected to strict 
scrutiny were struck down in 97 percent of district court cases and 87 percent of appellate cases).  
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III. REED’S VICES 
 
 In insisting that all laws that employ either “obvious” or “subtle” content 
distinctions should be considered, for constitutional purposes, presumptively invalid and 
subject to strict scrutiny, the Reed majority articulated, what we might call, borrowing 
from equal protection scholarship, an “anti-classificatory” test of content discrimination. 
 Equal protection scholars use the term anti-classification to refer to the view of 
the Equal Protection Clause that has been dominant on the Court since at least the early 
1990s.114 On this view, the government presumptively violates its obligation to provide 
equal protection of the law whenever it classifies individuals on the basis of a limited 
number of constitutionally “suspect” categories, such as race or nationality or alienage.115 
Or, at least, on this view, the government presumptively discriminates whenever it 
classifies individuals on the basis of a suspect category and the result is to burden or 
benefit those classified.116 When the government acts in this way, proponents of this view 
of the Equal Protection Clause insist that its actions will be constitutional only if they 
satisfy strict scrutiny.117 
 Reed articulates an almost identical approach to the analysis of allegedly 
discriminatory speech regulations. It too insists that whenever the government classifies 
individuals on the basis of a constitutionally “suspect” category, and the result is to 
burden or benefit those so classified, it acts presumptively unconstitutionally.118 The only 
real difference between the Reed test of content discrimination and the test of 
discrimination articulated in the Court’s recent equal protection cases is the identity of 
the suspect categories. If, in the equal protection context, the categories that are 
considered suspect are racial categories or categories of national origin or alien status, the 
categories that Reed identifies as constitutionally suspect are instead content-based 
categories. Indeed, the first question that Reed requires courts to ask when confronted 
with an allegedly discriminatory content-based speech regulation is essentially the same 
                                                            
114 See, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv L Rev 1470, 1475–76 (2004); Balkin and Siegel, 
58 U Miami L Rev at 9 (cited in note 14).  
 115 The most succinct recent articulation of this view can be found in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
assertion in his plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District 
Number 1 that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating”—that is, 
making legal distinctions—“on the basis of race.” 551 US 701, 747–48 (2007) (plurality). Although race 
remains the archetypal suspect category, the Court has recognized the existence of other suspect categories 
such as nationality and alienage. Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 371–72 (1971). 
116 Racial classifications that merely describe social reality—such as, for example, the racial 
classifications employed on the census—are not in fact usually reviewed under strict scrutiny. See Balkin 
and Siegel, 58 U Miami L Rev at 18 (cited in note 14) (noting that “courts seem to act on the belief that a 
group-based classification must inflict some dignitary or distributive harm to violate the anticlassification 
principle”); see also Morales v Daley, 116 F Supp 2d 801, 813–15 (SD Tex 2000) (declining to apply strict 
scrutiny to census policies that require the collection of individual racial as well as other demographic 
information because it is “differential treatment, not classification [per se], that implicates equal 
protection”). 
 117 Adarand Constructors, 515 US at 227. 
 118 Hence, the Court concluded that the Gilbert ordinance was facially content-based—and 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny—because it “treated [speakers] differently” based on nothing other than 
the content of their signs. Reed, 135 S Ct at 2227. 
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question courts must ask when confronted with an allegedly discriminatory race-based 
regulation: does the law treat individuals differently on a constitutionally suspect basis? 
Nor is it only in its first step that the Reed test mirrors contemporary equal 
protection doctrine. So too does its second step, which requires courts faced with a 
speech regulation that does not make a facial content distinction to determine whether the 
regulation was enacted in order to further illegitimate ends.119 This is essentially the same 
inquiry that courts must engage in when faced with an equal protection challenge to a 
facially neutral law. This is the case even though, in First Amendment cases, it is the 
government that has the burden of demonstrating that a speech regulation is adequately 
justified by a legitimate purpose and in equal protection cases, it is the litigant who bears 
the burden of establishing the existence of a discriminatory purpose.120 In practice, this 
differences matters very little, given how easy it is for the government to establish that a 
facially neutral law is adequately justified and how difficult it is for litigants to establish a 
discriminatory purpose.121 The result is that, after Reed, what will determine in the vast 
majority of both free speech and equal protection cases whether strict scrutiny applies is 
whether the challenged law employs a “suspect” classification on its face. 
That Reed makes the rules that govern content discrimination cases so similar to 
those that govern race discrimination cases is not entirely surprising. There are, after all, 
deep continuities between First Amendment and equal protection law. In equal protection 
law, for example, as in free speech law, the Court has tended to equate discrimination 
with discriminatory purpose.122 And in both bodies of law, the tiered system of scrutiny 
has come to serve essentially the same doctrinal function: by imposing very rigorous 
scrutiny on constitutionally “suspect” laws, it “ensure[s] that courts are most skeptical in 
cases in which it is highly predictable that illegitimate motives are at work” and less 
skeptical in other cases.123  
Nor are these the only similarities between these two bodies of law. As in its First 
Amendment cases, the Court’s equal protection cases have generated sharp disagreement 
among the justices about how broadly strict scrutiny should apply. For a time, this 
disagreement produced the kind of vacillation in the Court’s race discrimination cases 
that has characterized First Amendment doctrine. This is evident in the Court’s decisions 
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s addressing equal protection challenges to affirmative 
                                                            
119 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2227 (“[L]aws that cannot be justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, or that were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the message [the 
speech] conveys, . . . like those that are content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.”) 
(quoting Ward, 491 US at 791) (quotation marks omitted).   
120 Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 US 252, 264–66 
(1977) (requiring “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose . . . to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause” in cases involving facially neutral laws). 
121 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan L Rev 1111, 1136 (1997) (noting that the very high evidentiary standards 
required to establish discriminatory purpose “insulate[] many, if not most, forms of facially neutral state 
action from equal protection challenge”). 
 122 McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 292 (1987) (“[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection 
violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination.”); Washington v Davis, 426 
US 229, 240 (noting that it is a “basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed 
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”) (quotation 
marks omitted).  
123 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4, 78 (1996). 
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action programs and to other minority empowerment policies that classified individuals 
on the basis of race, but did so in order to integrate and equalize, rather than to segregate 
and divide. In some cases, the Court insisted that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard of review in these cases; but in other cases the Court applied a less demanding 
standard because it found that the purposes that led the government to enact these 
programs were constitutionally legitimate.124 In yet other cases, the Court failed to 
articulate a standard of scrutiny at all, because it could not agree on what standard should 
govern.125 
In its equal protection cases, the Court struggled to decide, in other words, 
between an anti-classificatory approach and a more purpose-oriented approach to racial 
classifications—just as it struggled to decide, in its First Amendment jurisprudence, 
between an anti-classificatory and a more purpose-oriented test of content discrimination. 
In this respect, the histories of the two constitutional doctrines of discrimination are quite 
similar.  
In other respects, however, the histories of the two doctrines of discrimination are 
quite dissimilar. In the Court’s equal protection cases, after several decades of uncertainty 
and vacillation, the anti-classificatory view won the day. In 1995, in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc v Pena,126 for example, the Court unequivocally rejected the possibility 
that a benign governmental purpose could justify treating laws that classify on the basis 
of race as anything less than constitutionally suspect. 127 In subsequent cases, the Court 
has adhered to this position, despite persistent dissent.128  
In the Court’s First Amendment cases, in contrast, the struggle between the two 
tests of content discrimination continued for much longer. Justices who readily signed on 
to the anti-classificatory view of equal protection continued to join—and even to 
author—opinions in which the Court upheld as content-neutral laws that made content 
distinctions on their face.129 The result was that, whereas the Court, by the mid-1990s, 
                                                            
124 Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC, 497 US 547, 564–65 (1990) (holding that “benign race-
conscious measures mandated by Congress.—even if . . . not “remedial” in the sense of being designed to 
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—are constitutionally permissible to the 
extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
125 Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267 (1986); Regents of University of California 
v Bakke, 438 US 265, 325 (1978). 
126 515 US 200. 
127 Adarand Constructors, 515 US at 227.  
128 For recent critiques of the majority’s anti-classificatory approach, see Fisher v University of 
Texas at Austin, 133 S Ct 2411, 2434 n 4 (2013) (Ginsburg, J dissenting) (“Actions designed to burden 
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day 
when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”) (quoting Gratz v Bollinger, 539 
US 244, 301 (2003); Parents Involved, 551 US at 836–37 (Breyer dissenting). 
 129 This was true of Justice Powell, for example, who was a vigorous advocate for a purposive 
approach to First Amendment equality but an equally vigorous advocate of an anti-classifactory approach 
to the Equal Protection Clause. Compare Bakke, 438 US at 289–90 (“The guarantee of equal protection 
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”) with Young v American 
Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 US 50, 73–84 (1976) (Powell concurring) (voting to uphold city zoning law that 
applied only to adult movie theatres because “[i]t is clear from both the chronology and from the facts that 
Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression”). Justice Powell was not the only 
member of the Court, however, who showed much more distaste for laws that classified on the basis of race 
than they did for laws that classified on the basis of content. The same was also true of Justices Rehnquist, 
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had firmly embraced the view that to stop discriminating on the basis of race, government 
must stop classifying on the basis of race, the Court had not embraced the view that to 
stop discriminating on the basis of content, one must stop classifying on the basis of 
content.  
It is Reed that brings the First Amendment doctrine of content discrimination and 
the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of race discrimination into alignment. In so doing, it 
makes it as difficult, at least in theory, for the government to make content distinctions as 
racial distinctions. 
 It is not obvious, however, that the same rules that apply to all racially 
classificatory laws should apply to all laws that classify on the basis of content. This is 
because of what we might call the different ontological status of race and content in 
American constitutional law.  
 
A.  The Constitutional Irrelevance of Racial Distinctions  
 
It is a basic principle of equal protection law that racial distinctions are “in most 
circumstances irrelevant” to the government when it regulates.130 This is what the Court 
asserted, in Hirabayashi v United States in 1943, to explain why “[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”131 Since then, the Court 
has repeated that claim on multiple occasions, often without further elaboration or 
exploration.132  
The claim is not a self-evident one, however. After all, we live in a racially 
stratified society, one in which racial and ethnic disparities are evident in almost all 
arenas of public and private life. Racial differences are closely correlated to where people 
live, their access to medical care, the likelihood that they will be victims of crime, and 
many other economic, social, and political differences.133 There are consequently many 
reasons, we might think, why the government might want to take race into account when 
making regulatory policy that have nothing to do with prejudice or animus.  
 The Court has nevertheless refused to allow the government to take race into 
account, even in response to the obvious racial differences in the society it governs. It has 
made clear that, even when the government makes what appear to be rational racial 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
White, and O’Connor. Compare Renton, 475 US 41 (applying a purpose test of content discrimination) 
with J.A. Croson Co, 488 US at 476 (plurality) (applying an anti-classificatory test of race discrimination) 
(plurality). Others on the Court, meanwhile, were strong proponents of anticlassification in the First 
Amendment context but strong critics of an anti-classificatory approach to equal protection. This was true, 
for example of Justices Marshall and Brennan. Compare Renton, 475 US at 55–56 (Brennan dissenting) 
with J.A. Croson Co, 488 US at 528–30 (Marshall dissenting).  
 130 Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81, 100 (1943). 
131 Id. 
132 See, for example, Parents Involved, 551 US at 741; Adarand Constructors, 515 US at 214; 
McLaughlin v Fla, 379 US 184 (1964). 
133 See, for example, Sara Sternberg Greene, Race Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 Iowa L 
Rev 1263 (2016) (noting significant racial disparities in housing); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, 
Place, and Power, 68 Stan L Rev 1323, 1357–59 (2016) (finding robust and stable differences in racial 
voting patterns); David R. Williams, Race, Health, and Health Care, 48 SLU L J 13, 15 (2003) (noting that 
“[r]acial and ethnic disparities are pervasive across a broad range of health outcomes and for multiple 
populations in the United States”). 
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distinctions—that is to say, when it treats individuals differently because of observable, 
even perhaps statistically significant, differences in the characteristics of different racial 
groups—its actions offend the Equal Protection Clause.134  
The Court’s refusal to allow the government to engage in what David Strauss has 
described as “rational discrimination” reflects its underlying belief that race is a social 
construct; or at least, that racial differences do not reveal anything about the individual’s 
inherent “ability to perform or contribute to society.”135 Hence, the Court presumes that 
differences in the characteristics of different racial groups are not inherent but the product 
of centuries of racial subordination and inequality. They are the product of private biases, 
in other words, to which the government cannot give effect without risking reinforcing.136  
As a result, the situations in which the government may constitutionally take 
racial differences into account are few and far between. The Court has acknowledged that 
the government can take race into account in order to promote diversity in the university 
setting, or to undo the effects of the government’s own prior acts of discrimination.137 But 
in the vast majority of cases, the Court has taken the view that government may not treat 
its citizens differently because of their race.138  The consequence is a public sphere in 
which the explicit use of racial distinctions are extremely rare. 
 
B.  The Constitutional Relevance of Content Distinctions 
 
The situation is very different when it comes to content distinctions. Unlike racial 
distinctions, content distinctions play a pervasive role in the regulation of both private 
and public life. 
Consider, for example, the rules that govern the private workplace. Federal labor 
laws prohibit employers from engaging in certain kinds of speech during union election 
                                                            
134 David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 S Ct Rev 99, 111 (1986) (“[I]t is well 
established that the prohibition against discrimination established by Brown extends to what I have called 
rational discrimination. A court’s decision to strike down rational discrimination would be constitutionally 
required.”); compare J.E.B. v Ala, 511 US 127, 139 n 11 (1994) (“Even if a measure of truth can be found 
in some of the gender stereotypes . . ., that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender 
in jury selection. We have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on 
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be 
conjured up for the generalization.”). 
135 Strauss, 1986 S Ct Rev at 108 (cited in note 134); Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 686 
(1973) (plurality) (noting that racial differences, like sexual differences, “frequently bears no relation to 
[the individual’s] ability to perform or contribute to society”). See also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive 
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich L Rev 213, 314 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s affirmative 
action decisions reveal the belief of the majority of justices on the Court that “race almost invariably should 
be irrelevant to governmental decisionmaking”). 
136 Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”). This helps explain why racial profiling is 
considered discriminatory, even when those who engage in it do so for the purpose of combatting crime, 
not harming minorities. See Albert Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution The Scope of Equal 
Protection, U Chi Legal F 163, 211 (2002) (“[T]reat[ing] race . . . as an indicator of criminality . . . [has the 
effect of] ratify[ing] and encourag[ing] the view that minorities are crime-prone [and] . . . is likely to 
encourage discrimination, not only in the administration of criminal justice, but throughout society.”). 
137 Parents Involved, 551 US at 721–22. 
 138 See, for example, Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 515–16 (2005) (Ginsburg concurring).   
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campaigns.139 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as many state and local 
laws, prohibit the use of speech that creates a hostile work environment.140 Health and 
safety regulations require employers to post signs containing certain kinds of information 
where their workers can see them.141 Rules of professional conduct—rules that the 
government helps to enforce—govern what doctors and lawyers may say when talking to 
their clients, or when soliciting new work.142  
 All of these rules involve distinctions between certain kinds of speech and 
others—distinctions that ultimately depend on the content of the expression. What 
employers are prohibited from doing under federal labor law is expressing certain  
messages (such as, for example, that a union strike will cause the workplace to close).143 
What workers are prohibited from doing under Title VII is expressing certain kinds of 
messages (such as, “you’re a slut”).144 What doctors are prohibited from doing is giving 
their patients medically unsound advice.145 What employers are required to do under a 
plethora of federal laws is conveying specific information to their workers.146 
 Although some of these rules have proven to be more controversial than others, 
courts have recognized that the government has legitimate reasons to regulate speech in 
these ways.147 They have recognized, for example, that the government can penalize 
                                                            
 139 Getman, 43 Md L Rev at 5 (cited in note 37) (noting that federal labor regulations “regularly 
enforced by the courts of appeals, limit the campaign arguments, the method of delivery, and even the tone 
of rhetoric that an employer may use” during the course of union elections). 
140 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L Rev 1791, 1799 
(1992) (quotation marks omitted) (“Harassment, courts have held—whether it is harassment by speech or 
by nonspeech conduct—violates Title VII if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment because of the worker’s sex, race, 
religion, or national origin.”). 
 141 See, for example, 29 CFR § 516.4 (“Every employer employing any employees subject to the 
[Fair Labor Standard] Act's minimum wage provisions shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the 
Act, as prescribed by the Wage and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every establishment where 
such employees are employed so as to permit them to observe readily a copy.”); 29 CFR § 1903.2(a)(1) 
(“Each employer shall post and keep posted a notice or notices . . . informing employees of the protections 
and obligations provided for in the [Occupational Safety and Health] Act, and that for assistance and 
information, including copies of the Act and of specific safety and health standards, employees should 
contact the employer or the nearest office of the Department of Labor.”). 
142 Post, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 949 (cited in note 37) (noting that “[w]hen a physician speaks to the 
public, his opinions cannot be censored and suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion 
within the medical establishment. But when a physician speaks to a patient in the course of medical 
treatment, his opinions are normally regulated on the theory that they are inseparable from the practice of 
medicine.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints 
on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 Fordham L Rev 569, 569 (1998) (“Lawyers, as professionals, are 
subjected to speech restrictions that would not ordinarily apply to lay persons. These restrictions have been 
particularly prevalent in the areas of solicitation of clients, lawyer interaction with the media, and lawyer 
advertising.”).  
143 NLRB v Gissel Packing, 395 US 575, 588–89. 
144 See, for example, EEOC v Hacienda Hotel, 881 F2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir 1989). 
145 Post, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 949–50 (cited in note 37). 
146 See note 141. 
147 There is a vigorous debate for example about whether the breadth of the prohibition against 
sexually harassing speech violates the First Amendment. See, for example, Volokh, 39 UCLA L Rev (cited 
in note 140); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of 
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex L Rev 687 (1997). Even critics of the rules acknowledge however that 
some sexually harassing speech at work can be punished because of its content. Volokh, 39 UCLA L Rev 
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harassing speech in order to ensure equality of access to the workplace;148 that it can limit 
employer speech during union election campaigns in order to ensure that union elections 
are free and fair; 149 and that it can limit the speech of doctors and lawyers in order to 
promote the integrity of their professions and the wellbeing of their patients and 
clients.150 The widespread recognition that content-based distinctions play an important 
role in the regulation of the workplace helps explain why the standard of means-end 
scrutiny that applies in work environments tends to be relatively lenient, and why the 
strong presumption against content-based regulation does not apply. 
Even when it comes to the regulation of speech in the public sphere—to speech to 
which the presumption against content-based restrictions does apply—content 
distinctions play an important regulatory role. This is true even though the range of 
purposes that may legitimately motivate the government to employ content distinctions in 
the public sphere is more limited than when it regulates in the private sphere. This is 
because First Amendment doctrine recognizes the distinction between what Immanuel 
Kant famously described as the “public” and the “private use of one’s reason.”151 That is 
to say, it recognizes, or at least presumes, that speech that addresses itself to a public 
audience is especially important to the marketplace of ideas. 152  Thus, when the 
government regulates public speech, the constitutional constraints on its authority are 
much greater. In such cases, the government is barred not only from punishing speech 
because it dislikes it, as it is prohibited from doing when it regulates the private sphere,153 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
at 1807 (cited in note 140) (“Many harassment cases involve truly harrowing abuse, abuse that can shut 
women and minorities out of the workplace almost as surely as would explicit discrimination in hiring.”). 
148 See, for example, Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 902 (11th Cir 1982) (noting that 
“[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit 
the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality”). 
149 Gissel Packing, 395 US at 619 (holding that government may prohibit employers from 
communicating, even indirectly, a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” during the course of a 
union election, in order to protect economically dependent employees against employer coercion).  
150 Planned Parenthood of Se Pa v Casey, 505 US 833, 838 (1992) (affirming state’s right to 
compel physicians to provide specific information to their patients about abortion and holding more 
generally that “the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated only as part of the 
practice of medicine, which is licensed and regulated by the State”); Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 
436 US 447, 460 (1978) (upholding state professional rule prohibiting certain kinds of legal solicitation 
given the state’s “general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions” and its 
“special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions”). 
151 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in H.S. Reiss, ed, 
Political Writings 54, 55 (1991) (“[T]he public use of one's reason must be free at all times, and this alone 
can bring enlightenment to mankind. On the other hand, the private use of reason may frequently be 
narrowly restricted without especially hindering the progress of enlightenment. By ‘public use of one's 
reason’ I mean that use which a man, as scholar, makes of it before the reading public. I call ‘private use’ 
that use which a man makes of his reason in a civic post that has been entrusted to him.”).  
152 This helps explain the persistent emphasis in the cases on public speech. See, for example, 
Cohen, 403 US at 24 (arguing that the “constitutional right of free expression . . . is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion”) (emphasis added); Thornhill v Ala, 
310 US 88, 101–02 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution 
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without 
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”) (emphasis added). 
153 See, for example, Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 675 (1994) (holding that the government 
has greater power to regulate speech when operating as a public employer because of its interest in 
“achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible” but that it may not restrict speech that does 
not interfere with its legitimate workplace goals). 
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but when it pursues legitimate ends via paternalistic means.154 For example, in contrast to 
when the government regulates private speech, when the government regulates public 
speech, it may not limit the speech of the more powerful in order to protect the less 
powerful against indirect forms of threat and coercion. Instead, it may prohibit coercive 
speech only when it represents a “serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”155 Nor may the 
government limit speech because it may persuade people to do bad things, or because it is 
offensive or threatening to the status quo, as it can when it regulates in the private 
sphere.156  
 Even given these constraints, though, there are good reasons why the government 
might want to, and regularly does, make content distinctions when regulating the speech 
of public citizens. Consider, for example, privacy laws. Laws of this sort frequently 
prohibit the use or distribution—including the public use and distribution—of personally 
identifiable information.157  They make, in other words, a content-based distinction 
between information that can be used to identify a person and information that cannot. 
We can well understand why the government might want to employ a distinction of this 
sort. This is because the unconstrained dissemination of such information poses a 
distinction threat to personal privacy.158   
 We cannot therefore presume that when the government distinguishes between 
these two kinds of information it does so in an attempt to “control the search for truth” or 
to “give one side on a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to 
the public.” Nor is it necessarily acting paternalistically. In fact, it is highly unlikely that 
when the government regulates personal information its motive is to prevent people from 
being persuaded by “bad” speech to do bad things, or to shield them from offensive or 
unpleasant speech. The best explanation of these laws is that they represent an effort to 
                                                            
 154 Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 212 (cited in note 90) (“The Court has long embraced an 
‘antipaternalistic’ understanding of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”).  
155 Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003).  
 156 See, for example, Waters, 511 US at 672 (noting that while, when it comes to the regulation of 
public speech “[t]he First Amendment demands a tolerance of verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance, as necessary side effects of . . . the process of open debate,. . . a government employer may bar 
its employees from using . . . offensive utterance[s] to members of the public or to the people with whom 
they work”; and that “though a private person is perfectly free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state 
governor’s legislative program, we have never suggested that the Constitution bars the governor from firing 
a high-ranking deputy for doing the same thing”) (quotation marks omitted); Post, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 977 
(cited in note 37) (“[W]hen physicians address the general public, they are . . . free to express themselves as 
they wish, without the constraints of ordinary professional responsibility. But when physicians speak to us 
as our personal doctors, they must assume a fiduciary obligation faithfully and expertly to communicate the 
considered knowledge of the ‘medical community.’”). 
 157 See, for example, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy 
Rule, 45 CFR § 164.502 (imposing significant constraints on the use and dissemination of “individually 
identifiable health information”); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DDPA”), 18 USC § 2721 et seq 
(prohibiting individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from motor vehicle 
records); See generally Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L J 967, 971–73 (2003) (describing the many and varied state and federal 
laws that regulate the disclosure of personal information). 
158 As the Court has recognized, “[t]he capacity of technology to find and publish personal 
information … presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it 
seeks to secure.” Sorrell, 564 US at 579. 
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protect individual autonomy, by allowing individuals to maintain some control over who 
knows what about them.159 
 This is not to say that privacy laws pose no First Amendment problems.  Like any 
regulations of speech, they can be employed for bad purposes. And when they deprive the 
press or other relevant actors of important information on matters of public concern, they 
can undermine the quality of public debate and thereby violate the First Amendment.160 
But there is nothing inherently problematic about privacy laws from a standpoint of 
discriminatory purpose—which is why courts have frequently upheld the constitutionality 
of such laws when they restrict speech that does not touch on “matters of public 
concern.”161 
 The same is true of many other kinds of facially content-based regulations of 
public speech. Consider, for example, campaign finance laws. These frequently impose 
restrictions on electioneering speech that are not imposed on other kinds of speech.162 
This is a content distinction—what makes something electioneering speech is the fact that 
it refers to a candidate for elected office.163 Yet the Court has recognized that the 
government has a compelling interest in regulating electoral speech in order to preserve 
the integrity of the electoral process.164 
                                                            
 159 The Court has recognized on multiple occasions the important First Amendment interests 
promoted by privacy laws. See, for example, Bartnicki, 532 US at 532–33 (noting that “[p]rivacy of 
communication is an important interest” and that “the fear of public disclosure of private conversations 
might well have a chilling effect on private speech”); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 483 (1965) 
(“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”). 
160  In such cases, the Court has not hesitated to strike laws of this kind down. See, for example, 
Florida Star, 491 US 524; Smith v Daily Mail Publishing Co, 443 US 97 (1979).    
161 See, for example, Dahlstrom v Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F3d 937, 949 (7th Cir 2015) 
(upholding the DDPA against constitutional challenge on the grounds that the government has a “legitimate 
interest in preventing stalkers and criminals [from] acquir[ing] personal information from state DMVs”) 
(quotations omitted); Law School Admission Council, Inc v State, 222 Cal App 4th 1265, 1271–72 (2014), 
as modified (Feb 11, 2014) (reversing injunction against enforcement of California law that prohibited the 
LSAC from informing law schools that candidates received an accommodation when taking the LSAT); 
Individual Reference Services Group, Inc v FTC, 145 F Supp 2d 6, 43–44 (DDC 2001), affd sub nom; 
Trans Union LLC v FTC, 295 F3d 42 (DC Cir 2002) (upholding constitutionality of regulation that requires 
banks to inform customers when using or disseminating their personally identifiable information).   
162 See, for example, 52 USC § 30104(f) (imposing detailed reporting requirements on anyone 
who “makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in 
an aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year”); 52 USCA § 3012(a) (requiring 
electioneering communications to clearly state if funded and/or authorized by a political committee, or 
candidate, or by some other source). 
163 11 CFR § 100.29 (defining electioneering communications as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that: (1) [r]efers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly 
distributed within 60 days before a general election . . .; or within 30 days before a primary or preference 
election [and] (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate, in the case of a candidate for Senate or the House 
of Representatives”). 
164 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 370–71 (2010) (“With the advent 
of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. 
. . . This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 66–68 (1976) (noting that disclosure requirements 
“provide[] the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from . . . [and 
therefore aid] the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office . . .[,] deter actual corruption and avoid 
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 Or consider the many laws that prohibit making false statements to government 
agents165 or falsely claiming to be a government agent.166 In distinguishing between true 
and false speech, these laws make an obvious content distinction. Nevertheless, it is easy 
to understand why he government might want to penalize false speech to and about 
government agents. This is because false speech creates harms that true speech does not: 
it undermines the integrity of government processes. It undermines the ability of law 
enforcement to effectively investigate crime, the ability of federal agents to distribute 
benefits in accordance with law, and the ability of the public to trust that government 
officials are who they say they are.167 
 These examples merely hint at the diverse range of contexts in which content 
distinctions help the government tailor its coercive force to the specific harms that 
different kinds of speech can create. Indeed, one can easily come up with many other 
examples of content distinctions that, until Reed, played a relatively unproblematic role in 
the regulation of the public sphere. Sign laws, for example, regularly distinguish between 
directional and non-directional signs.168 Federal aviation law requires pilots to ensure that 
passengers are provided specific safety information at the beginning of all flights.169 
Right of publicity laws impose penalties on those who misappropriate another person’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity . . .  
[and provide] the data necessary to detect violations of [campaign finance laws]”).  
 165 See, for example, 18 USC § 1001 (making it a crime to knowingly and willfully “make[] any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or make[] or use[] any false writing or 
document . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 
Government of the United States”); Ala Code § 13A-10-9 (making it a crime to “knowingly make[] a false 
report . . . to law enforcement authorities of a crime or relating to a crime”); DC Code Ann § 5-117.05 
(same); Fla Stat Ann § 817.49 (same). For a list of dozens of similar laws, see United States v Gaudin, 28 
F3d 943, 961 n 3 and 4 (9th Cir 1994) (Kozinski dissenting). 
166 18 USC § 912 (criminalizing the actions of those who “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an 
officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency, or officer 
thereof, and acts as such”); 18 USC § 709 (prohibiting a speaker’s unauthorized use of federal agencies’ 
names in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that the speaker’s message was 
approved or endorsed by the agency). 
167 Courts have recognized as much. See, for example, Bryson v United States, 396 US 64, 70 
(1969) (noting the “valid legislative interest in protecting the integrity of official inquiries”); People v 
Morera-Munoz, 210 Cal Rptr 3d 409, 420 (Ct App 2016) (holding that a state law that prohibited the 
making of false reports to police officers protected against “th[o]se falsities [that] have the potential to 
corrupt an official investigation”); United States v Barnow, 239 US 74, 78 (1915) (“In order that the vast 
and complicated operations of the government of the United States shall be carried on successfully and 
with a minimum of friction and obstruction, it is important . . . that a spirit of respect and good will for the 
government and its officers shall generally prevail. And what could more directly impair this spirit than to 
permit unauthorized and unscrupulous persons to go about the country falsely assuming, for fraudulent 
purposes, to be entitled to the respect and credit due to an officer of the government?”). 
168 See, for example, Dover, Del Code of Ordinances, Pt II, App B, Art 5, § 4.5(F) (exempting 
directional signs from general licensing requirement provided such signs are no more than three square feet 
in size). City of Fort Worth Sign Ordinance, 6.403 (exempting from general permit requirement 
“[w]arning, security and directional signs for parking or vehicle access” as well as “informational, 
directional or traffic signs”). 
 169 14 CFR § 136.7 (requiring pilots to ensure before takeoff that each passenger has been briefed 
on emergency and smoking regulations). 
 30 
name or likeness for their own economic benefit.170 National security laws criminalize 
the distribution of material containing secret or classified information.171  
The fact that content distinctions play such an important role in regulation reflects 
what we might call the different ontological status of content and racial distinctions in 
contemporary constitutional law. It reflects the fact that, in contrast to racial distinctions, 
the Court does not consider content distinctions to be merely social constructions—the 
product of unjust social forces, mystifications that hide from us our essential humanity. 
Instead, it recognizes that content distinctions sometimes reflect real differences in the 
characteristics of different kinds of speech.172 Or at least, it recognizes this to be true of 
content distinctions other than those based on viewpoint.  
The Court has not upheld an explicitly viewpoint-based regulation of public 
speech in almost thirty years.173  One could thus interpret the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence as establishing the principle that viewpoint distinctions—like racial 
distinctions—are so rarely relevant to the government’s legitimate aims that they are, for 
all intents and purposes, impermissible mechanisms of lawmaking.174  
The same is not true, however, of other kinds of content distinctions, which the 
Court has, on many occasions, upheld. And certainly the Court has never suggested that, 
when making these kinds of content distinctions, the government may not rely upon 
generalizations about the characteristics of the different kinds of speech. It has instead 
insisted that when the government relies upon generalizations, they should be 
accurate.175 The result is that there are many contexts in which the government can, and 
regularly does, take subject matter—and various other kinds of content—distinctions into 
account.  
                                                            
 170 See, for example, Cal Civ Code § 3344 (“Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for 
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, 
without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons 
injured as a result thereof.”); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2741.02 (prohibiting the use of “any aspect of an 
individual’s persona for a commercial purpose” for a period of sixty years after their death).  
 171 See, for example, 18 USC § 793; 18 USC § 798. 
172 This helps explain why content distinctions play such an important role in the doctrinal rules 
the Court applies in First Amendment cases. See Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content 
Discrimination, 68 Va L Rev 203, 211–14 (1982). 
173  The last case in which the Court upheld a viewpoint-based regulation of high-value speech 
was, as far as I can discern, Meese v Keene, 481 US 465 (1987) (upholding law imposing registration 
requirements on foreign agents who disseminate “political propaganda,” defined to include material which 
“advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or 
other conflict involving the use of force or violence”). Even still, the Court upheld the law as constitutional 
only after finding that it did not restrict any speech or impose any “burden on protected expression.” Id at 
480. 
174 Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 200 (cited in note 90) (noting the Court’s tendency to apply 
strict scrutiny even to modest viewpoint-based laws). 
 175  See, for example, Mosley, 408 US at 100 (holding that city may not prohibit some types of 
pickets but not others unless it demonstrates “that [the] picketing [it prohibits] is clearly more disruptive 
than the picketing [it] already permits”); Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School Distict, 393 
US 503, 508–09 (1969) (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. . . . In order for the State in the person of school 
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action 
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”). 
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C. The Consequence of the Difference Between Content and Race 
 
 The fact that the government may employ content distinctions to further all sorts 
of ends but may not employ racial distinctions undermines the implicit analogy that Reed 
draws between the law of content discrimination and the law of race discrimination. This 
is because one of the primary justifications the Court has provided for treating all laws 
that employ racial classifications as suspect is that there are so few legitimate reasons for 
government to employ such distinctions, thus suggesting improper motivation when it 
does so. As Justice White explained in Cleburne v Cleburne Texas Living Center:176 
 
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if 
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. … The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by 
race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the 
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such 
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in 
the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.177  
   
 The irrelevance of racial distinctions is not the only justification the Court has 
provided for treating all racially classificatory laws as suspect. It has also argued that 
laws that employ racial distinctions are especially likely to be the product of invidious 
motivations, given the “long and tragic” history out of which they emerge.178 It has also 
suggested that laws that employ racial distinctions are particularly problematic because 
they discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic—one for which the 
individual bears no responsibility.179  
 The Court has nevertheless made clear that, even if not a sufficient condition for 
suspect class status, the fact that race is “seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest” is a necessary condition for it. Conversely, the Court has made 
clear that classifications that do not share these characteristics need not be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. In Cleburne, for example, the Court explained that mental disability 
should not count as a suspect or even semi-suspect classification for equal protection 
purposes because legislation … singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the 
                                                            
176 473 US 432 (1985). 
177 Id at 440.  
178 See, for example, Bakke, 438 US at 303 (“[T]he perception of racial classifications as 
inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history”); Mass Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 
307, 313 (1976) (denying suspect class status to the aged because “[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this 
Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been 
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment”) (quotation marks omitted). 
179 Frontiero, 411 US at 686 (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the 
members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”) (quotation marks omitted); 
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart dissenting) (“The color of a person’s skin and the 
country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability, or 
any other characteristics of constitutionally permissible interest to government.”). 
 32 
real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others”—differences that were 
“not only legitimate but desirable” for the government to take into account.180 Hence, the 
Court argued, to treat the mentally disabled as a suspect or semi-suspect class would do 
more harm than good, because although “legislation designed to benefit, rather than 
disadvantage, the retarded would generally withstand examination under a test of 
heightened scrutiny . . . merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms 
may lead it to refrain from acting at all.”181 And, indeed, the affirmative action cases 
provide a vivid illustration of how severe a constraint on government power the 
declaration of suspect class status can be.182  
 There is no reason to think that a similar concern with the constraining and even 
perhaps chilling effects of strict scrutiny should not apply in the First Amendment 
context as well. Here too, the Court has long recognized, as we saw in Part I, that the 
regulation of speech furthers important constitutional as well as extra-constitutional 
goals. For that reason, the Court should be as concerned about the costs of strict scrutiny 
in the First Amendment as in the equal protection context. 
And yet, if the same concerns apply, the Reed test starts to look much less 
attractive. This is because, given the many legitimate reasons the government has to 
make content distinctions when it regulates speech, what Reed seems to require is the 
application of strict scrutiny to many laws that are not in fact the product of a 
discriminatory purpose. And given how difficult it is for the government to satisfy the 
demands of strict scrutiny, the likely result will be to invalidate many laws that are not 
discriminatory, as the Court understands the term.183  
Nor can the Reed test easily by justified by recourse to a theory of discriminatory 
effect.  Even if one rejected the focus on discriminatory purpose, and instead construed 
strict scrutiny as a defense against regulations that are particularly likely to disparately 
effect the expression of particular ideas or topics, Reed would still require applying strict 
scrutiny to many laws that do not pose a significant threat to First Amendment interests. 
This is because the presence or absence of content classifications is not a reliable 
predictor of a law’s disparate effects. Some facially content-based laws may have a very 
modest impact on the ability of speakers to communicate.184 Laws prohibiting the 
                                                            
180 Cleburne, 473 US at 444.  
181 Id.  
182 Siegel, 49 Stan L Rev at 1142 (1997) (cited in note 121) (“[T]oday, especially in the area of 
race, doctrines of heightened scrutiny are functioning primarily as a check on affirmative action 
programs.”). See also David Schraub, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, 84 UMKC L Rev 859 (2016) 
(arguing that supporters of gay rights should not push the Court for suspect class status because doing so 
would limit, rather than enhance, their ability to protect their interests in the political process). 
183 One could make the same argument about the use of strict scrutiny to review affirmative action 
laws. This is because the Court has recognized that, when the government acts to regulate admissions to 
universities, there are at least two legitimate, even “compelling,” reasons why it might want to take race 
into account—namely, to promote diversity and remedy past racial discrimination.  Parents Involved, 551 
US at 721–22. In these cases, as well, the application of strict scrutiny may therefore result in the 
invalidation of many laws that are not in fact a product of impermissible purposes. The argument is 
somewhat weaker in the affirmative action context, however, given the fewer range of permissible purposes 
the Court has recognized racially classificatory laws can promote when compared to facially content-based 
speech regulations. Nevertheless, the same logic holds. 
184 See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 200 (cited in note 90) (noting that “not every law that 
restricts the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information substantially prevents 
the message from being communicated” and that “[t]o the contrary, such restrictions are often limited in 
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impersonation of government officers, for example, burden speech only minimally. They 
prevent speakers from falsely pretending to be government officials, but not from 
criticizing, condemning, or praising government officers.185 As a result, they seem 
unlikely to have anything close to a significant disparate impact on the ability of different 
speakers to participate in the marketplace of ideas. The same is true of many other 
facially content-based laws.186  
Other content-based distinctions, meanwhile, operate to lessen the disparate 
effects of a law, by exempting or partially exempting from its operation those who are 
most likely to be severely burdened by it.187 The result is that many facially content-
based laws are unlikely to have the kind of disparate effects that critics have argued First 
Amendment doctrine should take into account.188 
What this means is that Reed likely imperils many laws that pose no significant 
threat to First Amendment interests. This is certainly what Justice Kagan argued in her 
concurring opinion in Reed, which Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined.189 Contra the 
majority claim that strict scrutiny is the correct standard of review whenever the 
government employs regulatory distinctions that turn on the content of speech, Kagan 
argued that it is only when there is a “realistic possibility that [the] official suppression of 
ideas is afoot,” that courts should—and had in the past—applied strict scrutiny.190 By 
refusing to employ this “common sense” approach to the content neutrality analysis, 
Kagan argued, the majority imperiled thousands of “eminently reasonable” sign laws for 
no good reason.191  
There is some evidence already, just two years after the decision was handed 
down, that Justice Kagan was correct when she predicted that Reed would result in the 
invalidation of many “eminently reasonable” laws. Indeed, by focusing entirely on 
Reed’s impact on sign laws, Justice Kagan may have underestimated the impact of the 
decision. In Reed’s aftermath, lower courts have relied upon the decision to strike down 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
scope, restricting expression in only narrowly defined circumstances.”). id at 219 (noting that the disparate 
effects of facially content-based laws is not necessarily greater than the disparate effects of facially content-
neutral laws that impose only a modest burden on expression).  
185 18 USC § 912. 
186 Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 200-01 (cited in note 90) (canvassing other examples of 
facially content-based laws that have only a minimal impact on the speech marketplace). 
187 See notes 206-207, and accompanying text. 
188 Susan Williams has argued, for example, that the Court has understood the anti-discrimination 
principle too narrowly to adequately protect free speech interests and that laws that “reduc[e] the 
availability of [particular] point[s] of view in the marketplace” or that “remove[] certain symbols or 
symbolic activities from the range of expression available to speakers” should also be considered 
discriminatory. Williams, 139 U Pa L Rev at 620 (cited in note 26). While some facially content-based 
regulations of speech probably will have these effects, it is unlikely all, even most, will. Even when 
evaluated according to this more expansive conception of content discrimination, the Reed test is in some 
respects too broad and in other respects too narrow, as I argue in Part IV. 
189 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2236 (Kagan concurring). 
190 Id at 2238–39. 
191 Id at 2239 (“As the years go by, courts will discover that thousands of towns have [content-
based] ordinances, many of them entirely reasonable. And as the challenges to them mount, courts will 
have to invalidate one after the other. . . . And courts will strike down those democratically enacted local 
laws even though no one—certainly not the majority—has ever explained why the vindication of First 
Amendment values requires that result.”). 
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not only sign laws192 but also panhandling laws,193 election laws,194 trademark laws,195 
and even state right-of-publicity statutes.196 
In at least some of these cases, it is far from obvious what First Amendment 
interests have been vindicated. Consider for example two recent decisions in which 
courts applied Reed to strike down facially content-based regulations of speech.  
Billboard Control  
The first case involved a constitutional challenge to the Texas Highway 
Beautification Act.197  The Texas law was enacted in 1972 in response to the passage of 
the Federal Highway Beautification Act, which, in an effort to “protect the public 
investment in . .  highways, . . . promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, 
and . . . preserve natural beauty” required states to impose strict limits on what 
“advertising signs, displays, and devices” could be erected adjacent to its interstate 
highways or risk losing a substantial portion of their federal highway funding.198 As 
required by the federal law, the Texas Highway Beautification Act prohibited the display, 
outside of urban areas, of any advertising signs or devices within 660 feet of the interstate 
highways.199 Like the federal law, however, it carved out a limited number of exemptions 
from the general ban on advertising signs and devices. It exempted, for example, 
“directional [signs], including advertising pertaining to a natural wonder or a scenic or 
historic attraction”; “outdoor advertising for the sale or lease of the property on which it 
is located”; “outdoor advertising solely for activities conducted on the property on which 
it is located”; and “outdoor advertising erected on or before October 22, 1965, that [is] 
determine[d] to be a landmark of such historic or artistic significance that preservation is 
consistent with the purposes of [the Act].”200  
                                                            
192 See, for example, Central Radio Co Inc v City of Norfolk, Va, 811 F3d 625, 629 (4th Cir 2016) 
(applying Reed to reverse earlier decision holding that sign code that applied to “any sign within the city 
which is visible from any street, sidewalk or public or private common open space” was content-neutral) 
(quotation marks omitted); Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v County of Alameda, 194 F Supp 3d 968, *3 
(ND Cal 2016) (holding that sign code that exempted official public signs from its restrictions was content-
based under Reed and striking it down on equal protection grounds); Auspro Enterprises, LP v Tex 
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The Act distinguished between permitted and prohibited billboards by reference 
to their content. In a pre-Reed decision, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the law as a 
reasonable content-neutral regulation of speech because it found it was adequately 
justified by the government’s legitimate interest in “stemming visual clutter on the 
landscape, . . . and promoting travel safety.”201  
 Reed changed the rules of the game, however, and when a constitutional challenge 
to the Texas law was brought before the Texas Court of Appeals in 2016, it concluded 
that the law should now be considered a content-based regulation of speech to which 
strict scrutiny applied.202 After a very cursory analysis of the relationship between the 
Highway Beautification Act’s means and ends, the court found that the law could not 
satisfy strict scrutiny because the signs it exempted from its billboard ban were not 
categorically less ugly or less dangerous to the traveling public than the signs it 
banned.203 The court therefore concluded that the Act was therefore fatally underinclusive 
with respect to the goal of preventing visual clutter and enhancing traffic safety.204 
 This conclusion is understandable given the tight fit between statutory means and 
statutory ends that strict scrutiny requires. Indeed, the Court has held that a law fails strict 
scrutiny if it fails to restrict a significant amount of speech that threatens the same kind of 
harm as the speech it does restrict. 205  This is because, as noted in Part I, such 
underinclusiveness casts doubt on the legislature’s purported motivations for the law. 
 In the context of the Texas Highway Beautification Act, though, the statutory 
exemptions do not cast doubt on the legislature’s motivations. This is so because to the 
extent they privilege any particular type of speech it is speech about historically 
significant places located near the highway and speech advertising goods and services 
located adjacent to the highway (gas stations, as well as antique stores).206 This is 
precisely the kind of speech the state would logically want to privilege if  it was trying to 
promote the recreational value of public travel—which of course was exactly what 
Congress was trying to do when it passed the Highway Beautification Act, and what the 
Texas legislature claimed it was trying to do when it enacted the Texas Beautification 
Act.207 
 Nor are there other reasons to be concerned about the law’s effect on free speech. 
Its impact on the marketplace of ideas is unlikely to be significantly distorting. Although 
the Act privileges speech about attractions and activities located near the highway, it does 
not privilege or burden any particular ideas or messages or topics. Directional markers 
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can direct travelers to all kinds of places. Local advertising signs can advertise all kinds 
of goods. And the law defines advertising broadly to include noncommercial as well as 
commercial messages.208 In fact, at least some of the statutory exemptions can reasonably 
be understood as efforts by Congress, and by proxy, by the Texas legislature, to lessen 
the distorting effects of the Act by exempting from its application those most likely to 
have no other feasible alternative than highway billboards to advertise their goods and 
services to the public: namely, those small businesses located along the side of the 
road.209  
The most obvious reading of the law, in other words, is that it represents an effort 
to reconcile a number of important but competing interests: on the one hand, its aesthetic 
interest in the “natural beauty” of the landscape; on the other hand, its interest in the 
safety and convenience of the traveling public; and on the third hand, its interest in 
ensuring that the Act does not deprive those who rely especially upon highway 
advertising to communicate information about their products, land, or services of what 
for them is an important means of communicating. This is the kind of reconciling of 
interests that legislatures are routinely allowed to do when they enact content-neutral 
laws..210   
It is therefore not surprising that, when characterized as content-neutral, the Texas 
Highway Beautification Act was found to be sufficiently narrowly-tailored to survive 
constitutional scrutiny but, when characterized as content-based, it was not. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how any of the remaining forty-nine state highway beautification acts, or 
the federal law, will be able to survive strict scrutiny, given the stringent tailoring now 
required by Reed.211 In fact, a Tennessee court recently issued an injunction against 
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enforcement of the Tennessee Billboard Act after finding, on similar grounds as the 
Texas court, that the plaintiff had a strong likelihood of succeeding on his First 
Amendment challenge to the Act.212 It is nevertheless hard to see what First Amendment 
interests are promoted by requiring Congress and the states either to prohibit all highway 
billboards or to prohibit none of them. Yet this is what the Texas decision portends. 
Robocalls 
Consider now a second post-Reed case—this time involving a First Amendment 
challenge to South Carolina’s anti-robocall law. 213  The law prohibited the use of 
automatic dialing devices to make unsolicited phone calls (“robocalls”) for commercial 
and some political purposes.214 The law exempted from its general ban calls made to 
persons with whom the robocaller had an existing or previous business relationship but 
imposed numerous restrictions on those robocalls that were allowed.215 
Robert Cahaly, a Republican political consultant, challenged the law on First 
Amendment grounds after he was charged with illegally making political robocalls in six 
South Carolina legislative districts in the weeks leading up to an election.216 Invoking 
Reed, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the law as a content-based regulation of speech.217 
The court assumed, for purposes of argument, that the law furthered a compelling state 
interest—namely, it protected residential privacy and tranquility from the unwanted 
intrusion of unsolicited robocalls.218 It nevertheless found that the law failed strict 
scrutiny because it was not the least restrictive means by which the state could have 
promoted this compelling interest. The court argued that, rather than banning only select 
robocalls, South Carolina could have protected residential privacy by imposing time-of-
day limitations, requiring mandatory disclosure of the robocaller’s identity, or creating a 
do-not-call-list.219 
This conclusion follows naturally from Reed. The least restrictive means 
requirement has been an integral part of the strict scrutiny analysis for many decades;220 it 
has been justified as yet another means by which courts ensure that the government’s 
motivations are what it says they are.221 
In this case, however, the fact that South Carolina did not employ what the court 
considered to be the least restrictive means available does not suggest that its motivations 
for enacting the anti-robocall law were censorial. This is so because all of the supposed 
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less-restrictive alternatives have obvious and significant weaknesses. There is by now 
plenty of evidence that do-not-call lists provide relatively weak protection against the 
problem of robocalls.222 Mandatory disclosure does little to prevent one of the problems 
associated with robocalls: namely, the annoying ringing of the telephone, particularly at 
dinnertime.223 And, of course, time-of-day limitations preserve residential privacy only 
during certain times of the day.  
One can therefore well understand why South Carolina might have chosen to 
address the problem of robocalls directly, by means of a ban on some robocalls. The 
problem of invasive robocalls exists almost entirely because of commercial telemarketers 
who, over the past three decades, have increasingly turned to inexpensive automated 
calling technology to reach consumers.224 The result has been what some have described 
as an “epidemic” of robocalling.225 As the FTC noted in 2013 testimony to the Senate, 
complaints about commercial robocalls increased from 63,000 per month in the fourth 
quarter of 2009 to 200,000 per month in the fourth quarter of 2012.226  There is also some 
evidence that consumers perceive commercial robocalls—robocalls made by 
telemarketers—as more invasive than robocalls made by schools, charitable 
organizations, and other nonprofit entities. Indeed, this is precisely what Congress found 
in 1991, when it enacted the federal anti-robocall law, the Telephone Consumer 
Protections Act.227  
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By prohibiting commercial but not charitable robocalls—by making it illegal to 
use an automated dialing device to sell products but allowing it to be used to invite 
friends to a birthday party or to send out a weather forecast—South Carolina was not 
making an arbitrary, and therefore presumably invidious, distinction.228 It was instead 
targeting the primary source of the evil it was trying to combat.  
This is not to say that the South Carolina law was unproblematic.  In addition to 
prohibiting commercial robocalls, it also prohibited some political robocalls.229 The state 
was unable to provide any evidence to the court for why these kinds of robocalls posed a 
more serious threat to residential privacy than the nonprofit robocalls the law 
permitted.230 In this respect, the law was, as the Fourth Circuit noted, overinclusive, 
insofar as it prohibited both speech the state had reason to believe posed a particular 
threat to residential privacy and speech that didn’t.231  
Nothing in the Fourth Circuit opinion turned on the overinclusivity of the South 
Carolina law, however. It was its failure to employ the least restrictive means available to 
protecting residential privacy that doomed the law. This suggests that the Fourth Circuit 
would have struck down the law had South Carolina, like many states and the federal 
government, prohibited only unsolicited commercial robocalls. Yet it is not clear what 
First Amendment interests would be advanced by doing so. There is little reason to 
believe that these laws are the product of a discriminatory purpose. Nor is their impact on 
the marketplace of ideas likely to be significant. The South Carolina law, like the federal 
and many similar state anti-robocall laws, do not prohibit phone calls; they merely 
prohibit automated phone calls.232  
By raising the costs of making robocalls, these laws attempt to encourage those 
who use this device to be more selective in whom they call. Given pervasive consumer 
unhappiness with the problem of unwanted robocalls, this does not seem to be an 
unreasonable thing for the legislature to attempt to do. And yet, in the name of expressive 
equality, Reed imperils these, as well as other, anti-robocall laws. 
 
C.  Implications  
  
These examples demonstrate how difficult Reed makes it for the government to defend 
facially content-based laws against constitutional challenge, even when there are good 
reasons for the government to employ the content distinctions it did. They give some idea 
of why, although the ideal of the colorblind society has long been an aspirational trope 
(wrongly or rightly) in equal protection law, free speech law has never been organized 
around the ideal of a content-blind society. This is because what Paul Brest argued was 
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true of racial classifications is absolutely not true of content classifications: namely, they 
do not “correlate[] so weakly with the legitimate characteristics for which [they] might be 
used as a proxy that … society loses little if they are presumptively forbidden.” 233  
Instead, the costs may be significant.  
 Of course, any system of prophylactic rules is likely to result in the invalidation of 
some laws that do not pose the problem the prophylaxis is designed to combat. That is the 
nature of prophylactic rules, and what makes them both useful and frequently 
controversial. 234  In this case, however the number of false positives that Reed is likely to 
produce is higher than the Court has indicated, in its equal protection cases at least, it will 
ordinarily allow.  
That it is willing to allow a significant number of entirely legitimate speech 
regulations to be invalidated under the Reed test presumably reflects the Court’s view 
that there is no adequate alternative test of content-based lawmaking, given the very 
evident problems with the “justified without reference” test canvassed in Part II. This is 
not an unreasonable belief, but as the next Part argues, it may be a mistaken one. This is 
because it is far from obvious that the problems with the justification test are an 
inevitable feature of the test, or evidence of lower courts’ unwillingness to protect speech 
unless absolutely forced to do so by the Court. Instead, many of the problems with the 
justified test can be blamed on the Court itself.  In this respect, Reed may be a case of 
chickens coming home to roost: the Court turning to an extremely broad test of content-
based lawmaking in response to its own failure to interpret the more nuanced “justified 
without reference” test with rigor.  
What this suggests is that, even if the test of content-based lawmaking that Reed 
announces is an improvement over what came before, it may nevertheless represent a 
second-best solution to the very serious problem of pretextual discrimination—and one 
that is likely to create significant doctrinal problems in the future.  
 
IV. ALTERNATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The fact that the anti-classificatory test of content-based lawmaking that Reed 
announces imposes such significant constraints on the government’s legitimate regulatory 
authority suggests that the decision should be considered a good solution to the problem 
of pretextual discrimination only if there are no other, less restrictive but equally effective 
means of guarding against the repressive impulses of both judges and legislatures.  
One might think, given the discussion of pre-Reed lower court opinions in Part II, 
that there isn’t: that when provided with the more discretionary “justified without 
reference to content” test of content-based lawmaking, lower courts failed to interpret it 
in a way that vigorously enforced free speech values or protected speakers against 
pretextual discrimination. Given that record, one might argue that a highly formal, bright-
line test like the one announced in Reed provides the only effective, if imperfect, means 
of enforcing the First Amendment’s anti-discrimination principle.235   
                                                            
233 Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv L Rev 1, 11 
(1976).  
234 On this point, see David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi L Rev 190 
(1988). 
235 Seth Kreimer has argued so much. In a pre-Reed article, he argued that the anti-classificatory 
test of content-based lawmaking articulated in cases such as Arkansas Writers Project and Simon & 
 41 
It is not obvious, however, that this is true. Although lower courts tended to apply 
the “justified without reference” test in the years prior to Reed in an overly lenient 
manner, there is no reason to assume that this leniency was due to the lower courts’ 
refusal to vigorously enforce the speech-protective rules the Supreme Court handed them. 
To the contrary, in taking the government’s claimed justifications at face value, the lower 
courts were simply following the Court’s own example. Indeed, almost all of the 
problems with the lower courts’ approach to the justification inquiry during this period 
can be traced to the Supreme Court itself. 
 
A.  The Devolution of the Justification Test 
  
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 236  the Court first 
articulated the general framework for cases involving potentially discriminatory 
regulations of public speech. The case involved a Chicago ordinance that prohibited the 
picketing of city public schools while they were in session and for half an hour before 
and after school was in session but that made an exception for picketing that occurred 
outside schools involved in labor disputes.237 The city interpreted the ordinance to ban all 
kinds of picketing outside schools (including schools involved in labor disputes) except 
labor pickets.238 The Court concluded that, construed as such, the ordinance violated both 
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment because it restricted speech 
because of its content.239  
The Court reached the conclusion that the ordinance was content-based because 
the city was unable to offer any legitimate reason for the distinction between labor and 
non-labor picketing. The city argued, for example, that it prohibited picketing, except for 
labor pickets, near schools in order to prevent disruption of the educational experience. 
The Court rejected this argument because the government provided no evidence 
demonstrating that non-labor pickets were more disruptive than labor pickets. “Although 
preventing school disruption is a city’s legitimate concern,” Justice Marshall noted, 
“Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours is not an 
undue interference with school. Therefore . . . Chicago may not maintain that other 
picketing disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly more disruptive than the 
picketing Chicago already permits.”240  
Similarly, the Court rejected the government’s claim that it exempted labor 
pickets from the law in order to avoid intruding on a sphere of activity normally governed 
by federal labor law.241 It rejected this argument because it found that the city’s desire to 
avoid the legal headaches caused by the potentially preemptive effect of federal labor law 
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was insufficient to justify the labor exemption. “This attenuated interest,” Marshall wrote, 
“at best a claim of small administrative convenience and perhaps merely a confession of 
legislative laziness, cannot justify the blanket permission given to labor picketing and the 
blanket prohibition applicable to others.”242  
Mosley established the principle that what is required to justify a speech 
regulation that involves “differential treatment” on the basis of content is clear evidence 
that the distinction actually furthers, or is likely to further, a significant governmental 
interest. In Carey v Brown, eight years later, the Court re-emphasized this point when it 
insisted, in the course of striking down a similar law, that “[w]hen government regulation 
discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum . . . any distinctions it 
draws must be carefully scrutinized.”243  
In subsequent decisions, however, the Court failed to insist on clear evidence that 
the distinctions speech regulations drew actually furthered an “appropriate government 
interest.” Instead, it interpreted the justification test to require only evidence showing that 
the government did not intend to repress ideas.   
Renton provides perhaps the most egregious example of the Court’s tendency, in 
these cases, to shy away from a rigorous application of Mosley. As noted earlier, Renton 
involved a First Amendment challenge to a local zoning ordinance that prohibited adult 
movie theaters from locating close to schools, churches, and other specified places.244 
The Ninth Circuit held that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because the city 
was unable to show that it actually furthered, or was likely to further, a substantial 
government interest.245 To justify the law, the city relied almost entirely on studies of the 
secondary effects of adult movie theatres in other cities, of very different size and 
character.246 The Ninth Circuit held that this was not adequate. “Renton has not studied 
the effects of adult theaters and applied any such findings to the particular problems or 
needs of Renton,” the court wrote. “We do not say that Renton cannot use the 
experiences of other cities as part of the relevant evidence upon which to base its actions, 
but in this case those experiences simply are not sufficient to sustain Renton's burden of 
showing a significant governmental interest.247 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision because it concluded that the city was 
entitled to rely upon the evidence compiled by other cities. “The First Amendment does 
not require a city,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, “before enacting such an ordinance, to 
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other 
cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be 
relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”248 The Court held that any more rigorous 
standard would limit the ability of municipalities like Renton to adequately respond to 
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novel social problems.249 The result of the Court requiring (as Justice Kennedy later put 
it) only “very little evidence” to uphold facially content-based zoning laws was to make it 
easier for governments to pretextually justify discrimination.250 Renton, in other words, 
“elevate[d] motive—which is easy for governments to fake and hard for courts to 
assess—over the more objective application and justification inquiries” the Court had 
previously used to deal with content-based discrimination.251 
Renton was not the only Supreme Court opinion to embrace this approach. A few 
years later, in Ward v Rock Against Racism, the Court once again emphasized intent over 
evidence, albeit this time in a case involving a challenge to a facially content-neutral law. 
The case involved a regulation that required performers at a Central Park bandshell to use 
a sound amplification engineer provided by the city.252 Rock Against Racism, a group 
that organized charity rock concerts in the bandshell, argued that the law was content-
based because it privileged a particular conception of sound quality (the city’s 
conception) and discriminated against its very different conception of what counted as 
quality sound.  The Court rejected this argument because it found no evidence in the 
record that the city was attempting to impose a particular aesthetic ideal on performers. 
To the contrary, it found evidence that the city “require[d] its sound technician to defer to 
the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix.”253 More generally, the Court 
concluded that the regulation was content-neutral because “the principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” In this case, the Court 
found that the city’s principal justification for the regulation—namely, that it was 
intended to “control noise levels at bandshell events”—did not evince a desire to repress 
speech because the government disliked its message.  
In reaching the conclusion that the sound regulation was adequately justified by a 
content-neutral purpose, the Court may have been correct. There was ample evidence that 
New York was not trying to repress the expression of messages or music it disliked, nor 
attempting to do anything other than what it said it was trying to do.254 The Court’s 
conclusion that the law was content neutral did not rest on this evidence, however. 
Instead, the Court relied solely on the city’s assertions of regulatory purpose—and the 
district court’s finding that the city enforced the law with deference to the wishes of 
concert organizers.255 
The opinion thus suggested that what the government had to show to establish the 
content neutrality of a speech regulation was not clear evidence that the speech it 
restricted differed in some relevant way from the speech it did not restrict, but merely the 
                                                            
249 Id at 52 (“The city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to 
admittedly serious problems” (quoting American Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 US at 71 (plurality)). 
250 Alameda Books, 535 US at 451 (Kennedy concurring) (“[W]e have consistently held that a city 
must have latitude to experiment, at least at the outset, and that very little evidence is required.”). 
251 Rienzi and Buck, 82 Fordham L Rev at 1200 (cited in note 110). 
252 Ward, 491 US at 787–88. 
253 Id at 792–93.   
254 Prior to enacting the speech regulation, the city attempted on several occasions to achieve a less 
speech-restrictive solution to the problem of excessive noise at the bandshell, and specifically the noise 
problems generated by the respondent in the case. Id at 784–88 (noting the “numerous complaints about 
excessive sound amplification” the city received and its multiple efforts to negotiate a solution with Rock 
Against Racism). 
255 Id at 792. 
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existence of some plausible, non-discriminatory purpose it intended the regulation to 
further. This is certainly how lower courts subsequently interpreted the decision. The 
Eighth Circuit, for example, relied heavily on Ward’s “principal inquiry” language to 
justify its conclusion in Thorburn that, because the targeted picketing law was not 
intended to suppress any particular messages, but applied to all targeted picketing, it was 
content neutral and subject only to intermediate scrutiny.256 The Ninth Circuit also relied 
upon Ward to conclude that the Gilbert sign ordinance was content-neutral because it was 
not obviously motivated by animus.257 
These opinions do not, in other words, demonstrate the unwillingness of lower 
courts to follow Supreme Court precedents. Rather, they demonstrate how inconsistent 
the Court has been in articulating the requirements of the justification test. They suggest, 
as a result, that the Court did not necessarily need to embrace the highly formalist test of 
content-based lawmaking that Reed announced in order to ensure that lower courts 
carefully evaluated potentially discriminatory speech regulations. Instead, the Court 
could merely have reaffirmed the rigorous standards that Mosley and other earlier cases 
insisted courts should apply when reviewing regulations of speech. 
 
B.  A Missed Opportunity  
 
Imagine an alternative universe in which, rather than denying that government 
purpose has any role to play in the content neutrality inquiry, the Court in Reed had 
instead concluded that the Gilbert ordinance was unconstitutional because the town failed 
to present any clear evidence that the distinctions it drew actually furthered its legitimate 
interests in reducing traffic accidents and maintaining the municipality’s aesthetic appeal. 
This is largely what Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion concluded.258  
Such an approach would have been superior to the approach taken in Reed in a 
number of ways. First, it would not have established a significantly overbroad rule. It 
would not, in other words, have required the application of strict scrutiny even in cases 
where the government has good reasons to employ the distinctions it employs. 
Second, and as a consequence, it would not have created a situation in which 
courts would be encouraged to apply the test narrowly, or to dilute the meaning of strict 
scrutiny to uphold laws they perceived to be entirely reasonable but that Reed designated 
as content-based. Justice Breyer warned in his concurring opinion that the majority rule 
might lead courts to “water[] down the force of the presumption against constitutionality 
that ‘strict scrutiny’ normally carries with it,” thereby “weaken[ing] the First 
                                                            
256 Thorburn, 231 F3d at 1117 (“Because the Lincoln ordinance regulates protected speech in a 
public forum, we first determine whether the ordinance is content-neutral or content-based in order to apply 
the appropriate level of scrutiny. The government cannot regulate speech because it disagrees with the 
message conveyed. . . . Lincoln does not disagree with a particular message; the ordinance applies equally 
to anyone engaged in focused picketing without regard to his message. Because Lincoln’s justification for 
the ordinance is the protection of residential privacy and tranquility and has nothing to do with the content 
of the regulated speech, the ordinance is content-neutral.”). 
257 Reed, 707 F3d at 1074–75. 
258 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2239 (Kagan concurring) (“The absence of any sensible basis for [the 
distinctions between directional, ideological, and political signs] dooms the Town’s ordinance under even 
the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to ‘time, place, or manner’ speech regulations. 
Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to every sign ordinance 
in every town across this country containing a subject-matter exemption.”). 
 45 
Amendment's protection in instances where ‘strict scrutiny’ should apply in full force.”259  
This is certainly a concern. But it is equally plausible that courts will simply apply the 
decision as narrowly as possible to avoid reaching unpalatable conclusions.   
Indeed, there is already plenty of evidence that courts are construing Reed 
narrowly in order to avoid reaching undesirable results. For example, in cases involving 
the regulation of strip clubs and other forms of adult entertainment, courts have continued 
to apply the Renton test of content neutrality rather than the much stricter Reed test.260 
This is notwithstanding the fact that, as a judge on the First Circuit acknowledged 
recently, the two opinions are “logically irreconcilable.”261  
These decisions demonstrate how Reed’s potentially more radical implications 
may be domesticated by the lower courts. They also, however, complicate the argument 
that Reed, because it is a formal test, provides more reliable protection against 
discrimination than the “justified without reference” inquiry. They suggest that formalism 
is not necessarily the best way to combat judicial bias, particularly in cases where the 
formal rule strikes judges as unreasonable. This is particularly the case given the very 
complicated doctrinal structure of much of First Amendment law. 262 The proliferating 
array of categorical distinctions that populate free speech doctrine make it quite easy for 
courts to distinguish Reed “up, down, and sideways.” 263 The result may be to only 
intensify what is already a pronounced threat: namely, overarching doctrinal 
incoherency.264 It also may inoculate from stringent constitutional scrutiny what are in 
fact very troubling laws, like the zoning laws at issue in Renton.  
By not requiring courts to distinguish the decision away, a revitalized justification 
test might, ironically, have provided more protection to speakers targeted by certain kinds 
of facially content-based laws. It also would have altered the standards that apply to the 
                                                            
259 Id at 2235 (Brennan concurring). 
260 See, for example, Cricket Store 17, LLC v City of Columbia, 2017 WL 360545 (4th Cir); 
American Entertainers, LLC v City of Rocky Mount, NC, 2016 WL 4728077, *11 (EDNC); BBL, Inc v City 
of Angola, 809 F3d 317, 326 n 1 (7th Cir 2015) (refusing to apply Reed on the grounds that “[w]e don’t 
think Reed upends established doctrine for evaluating regulation of businesses that offer sexually explicit 
entertainment, a category the Court has said occupies the outer fringes of First Amendment protection”). 
See also Free Speech Coalition, Inc v Attorney General United States, 825 F3d 149, 161 n 8 (3d Cir 2016) 
(citation omitted) (“Although we do not reach the issue, we . . . [think] that it is doubtful that Reed has 
overturned the Renton secondary effects doctrine.”). 
261 Free Speech Coalition, 825 F3d at 174 (Rendell dissenting). 
262 See for example Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons 
from the Twentieth Century, 36 Pepp L Rev 273, 274 (2009) (noting that First Amendment doctrine is 
“maddeningly complex”); Kagan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 515 (cited in note 25) (“noting that the “technical, 
complex classificatory schemes of First Amendment law” have only become “more intricate [over time], as 
categories have multipled, distinctions grown increasingly fine, and exceptions flourished and become 
categories of their own”); Williams, U Pa L Rev at 616 (cited in note 26) (“The doctrinal web surrounding 
the free speech clause of the first amendment is one of the most complicated and confusing areas in 
constitutional law.”). 
263 Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 Harv L Rev 1981, 1990-1992 
(2016) (documenting the various ways in which courts have distinguished Reed).  
264 Post, 47 Stan L Rev at 1275 (cited in note 48) (arguing that the “Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence, which is a lively and growing area of constitutional law, dances now macabrely on the edge 
of complete doctrinal disintegration”); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some 
Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L Rev 1497, 1497 (2007) (noting “increasing sense” that 
First Amendment doctrine “has become incoherent”). 
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review of facially content-neutral as well as to the review of facially content-based 
regulations.  
One of the great disadvantages of anti-classificatory rules like the one announced 
in Reed is that they make the stringency of the constitutional analysis depend almost 
entirely on the presence of proscribed classifications. But the fact that a statute fails to 
employ suspect classifications does not, by any means, imply that it is not a tool of 
discriminatory aims. Although it may be the case, for reasons discussed in Part II, that 
statutes that classify on the basis of race, or content, or other suspect classifications are 
more likely than other kinds of laws to reflect a discriminatory purpose, facially neutral 
laws can also provide a perfectly serviceable tool for the carrying out of unlawful 
purposes. Scholars of the Equal Protection Clause have argued in fact that today it is 
primarily by means of facially neutral laws that race and gender biases continue to be 
given effect in American law.265 The Court’s unwavering commitment to an anti-
classificatory approach to equal protection, they argue, provides as a result extremely 
poor protection against the often subtle forms of discrimination that perpetuate racial and 
other kinds of inequality in contemporary society.266  
The Court’s embrace of an anticlassificatory approach to the First Amendment 
raises the same concern. As Timothy Zick has noted, facially neutral speech 
regulations—regulations that distinguish between speakers on the basis of their location, 
or the genre of their speech, or some other, non-content features of that speech—can 
serve as “powerful weapon[s] of social and political control.” 267  Reed certainly 
incentivizes legislators who want to discriminate to figure out a facially neutral means of 
doing so. And yet the decision does nothing to address the very palpable weaknesses with 
the justification test, as it presently exists. 
                                                            
265 Siegel, 49 Stan L Rev at 1143) (cited in note 121) (“Today doctrines of heightened scrutiny 
function primarily to constrain legislatures from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender 
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267 Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex L Rev 581, 582 (2006). Zick cites as an 
example of this the 25-block restricted zone that prohibited all protests within 25 blocks of the 1990 World 
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the antiglobalization protestors who gathered in Seattle to communicate their message. Nevertheless, when 
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applying the deferential Ward test. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F3d 1113, 1129–30 (9th Cir 2005). 
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Of course, nothing prevents the Court from making clear, in a future decision, that 
a law is not justified by a content-neutral purpose simply because the government says it 
is. The analogy to the equal protection cases suggests, however, is that this is unlikely to 
occur. Scholars have complained for decades now about the weakness of the test of 
discrimination the Court has developed to smoke out discriminatory purpose in equal 
protection cases involving facially neutral laws, but to no avail.268 This is not surprising if 
one understands the Court’s turn to an anticlassificatory test of race discrimination as 
motivated, at least in part, by its discomfort with vesting courts with the discretionary 
authority that a more vigorous purposive inquiry would require. In its equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court has demonstrated a pronounced unwillingness to allow courts to 
strike down facially neutral laws absent extremely pronounced evidence of bad intent. 
There is no reason to believe its approach in First Amendment cases will be any different. 
The result is that Reed is likely to produce a test of content-based lawmaking that is both 
too broad and too narrow. 
 
C.  The Drawbacks 
 
This is not to say that a reinvigorated justification test would have no drawbacks. 
By requiring courts to determine in most cases whether there is sufficiently clear 
evidence to justify the differential treatment of speech, it would vest courts with 
considerably more discretion than they possess under Reed.   
This discretion could be cabined somewhat by embedding within the test a much 
narrower anticlassificatory rule. In her concurring opinion, Justice Kagan argued that, 
although courts should only apply strict scrutiny to laws that make subject matter and 
other kinds of content distinctions when they raise the “realistic possibility that [the] 
official suppression of ideas is afoot,” they should always apply strict scrutiny to laws 
that make viewpoint distinctions because laws of this sort always raise doubts about the 
government’s motivations.269  
This approach to the content discrimination inquiry would certainly not create the 
problems that the extension of strict scrutiny to subject matter-based and other kinds of 
content-based laws would, given how infrequently the government employs viewpoint 
distinctions when it regulates the public sphere, and how difficult it is to think of 
legitimate reasons why the government might wish to do so. It would also limit the range 
of cases in which courts would be required to evaluate the evidentiary basis of the 
government’s justifications in order to determine the standard of scrutiny that applies.  
What a test that applied strict scrutiny to all laws that make viewpoint distinctions 
would require courts to do, however, is to identify when laws make a viewpoint as 
opposed to some other kind of content distinction.  Given how blurry the line between 
subject matter and viewpoint distinctions frequently turns out to be, it is not all clear how 
                                                            
268 See for example Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 366-370 (1987); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal 
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum L Rev 1023, 1038-1039 (1979); Alan David 
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269 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan J., concurring). 
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much in practice Justice Kagan’s narrower anti-classificatory rule would actually 
constrain the discretion vested courts under the justification test.270  
A revitalized justification test would constrain judicial discretion in another way, 
however: namely, by reminding courts of the fundamental constitutional values that 
motivate the doctrinal rules. Over seventy years ago, in Schneider v. State, Justice 
Roberts asserted what remains today a fundamental principle of First Amendment law: 
namely, that although “[m]ere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of 
public convenience may . . .  support regulation directed at other personal activities, [they 
are] insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions” as the rights protected by the First 
Amendment.271 Hence, Justice Roberts concluded, “the delicate and difficult task falls 
upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the 
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the[se] rights.”272 
A test of content-based lawmaking that required courts, in almost all cases, to evaluate 
the empirical evidence provided to justify restricting speech in order to determine the 
level of scrutiny that applies would operate as a continuing reminder of this central First 
Amendment norm.  
This may be, ultimately, the best way to guard against the repressive impulses of 
judges, given the inherent power of courts to make even bright-line tests fuzzy. Vincent 
Blasi has argued that “[i]t would be a mistake to assume that the strategy for protecting 
the central norms of the first amendment must emphasize the tactic of doctrinal 
compulsion——the fashioning of specific, highly protective tests that would bind lower 
courts and officials in times of stress.”273 This is because, Blasi argued, it is difficult to 
fashion any legal rule “with sufficient prescience and precision to achieve that type of 
behavioral effect to any great degree.”274  The complicated ways in which lower courts 
are already trying to limit the effects of the Reed decision provide a good illustration of 
Blasi’s point. 
In articulating what Justice Thomas described in his opinion in Reed as a “clear 
and firm” test of content-based lawmaking, the Court may have thus been attempting to 
guarantee a kind of predictability that no formal test can provide.275 Meanwhile, it created 
a test that overly constrains the government’s regulatory autonomy in some respects and 
provides, in other respects, insufficient protection to those targeted by facially neutral 
laws. Given these serious problems with the Reed test, it is hard to see why a revitalized 
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justificiation test would have provided a worse solution to the problem of content 
discrimination than that which the Reed test provides—and in many respects it would 
have been far superior. 
Of course, the Reed majority did not embrace Justice Kagan’s alternative solution. 
Reed remains, for now at least, the law. The sheer breath of the Reed test makes it likely, 
however that Justice Kagan was correct when she predicted that its application would not 
be easy or without contestation: that litigants would continue to seek ways to narrow the 
test and that these efforts would continue to generate difficult questions about the scope 
and the meaning of the presumption against content-based lawmaking.276 Despite its 
efforts to do so, the Reed majority may not, in other words, have resolved the decades-
long fight over the meaning of the First Amendment anti-discrimination principle.  Going 
forward, it therefore behooves both scholars and courts to remember the costs, as well as 
the benefits, of an anti-classificatory approach.  
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